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Abstract 
 
 
With L∞ as the commodity space, the equilibrium price density is shown to be 
a continuous function of the commodity characteristics. The result is based on 
symmetry ideas from the Hardy-Littlewood-Pólya theory of rearrangements; 
and it includes, but is not limited to, the case of symmetric (rearrangement-
invariant) production costs and additively separable consumer utility. For 
continuous-time peak-load pricing of, e.g., electricity, this allows the inclusion 
of storage and of cross-price dependent demands. In this context a 
continuously varying price has two uses. First, it excludes the demand jumps 
that arise from discontinuous switches from one price rate to another. Second, 
in the operation and valuation of hydroelectric and pumped-storage plants 
(studied elsewhere), price continuity guarantees that their capacities (viz., the 
reservoir and the converter), the energy stocks and, in the case of hydro also 
the river flows, have well-defined marginal values. 
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1. Introduction
With cyclically priced goods such as electricity, a discontinuous time-of-use (TOU)
tari¤ is likely to result in disequilibrium by causing demand discontinuities that are
incompatible with pricing at marginal cost: e.g., with a sudden price drop, any con-
sequential demand jump means that the marginal cost also increases and begins to
di¤er from the ruling price. In such circumstances an equilibrium price has, there-
fore, to be a continuous function of time. For the case of cross-price independent
demand for electricity generated from a thermal technology, this result can be ob-
tained by the elementary method of supply and demand curves, the intersection of
which varies continuously in time if the demand curve does (Section 2). By exploiting
the results of [16], given also in [11], the argument can be extended to include energy
storage (Section 3). This is useful because, as we show in [16], price continuity guar-
antees that the capacities of a storage plant (viz., the reservoir and the converter)
have de…nite marginal values, i.e., the short-run pro…t function is di¤erentiable in the
…xed inputs.1 These values are instrumental in the short-run approach to long-run
equilibrium based on our extension of the Wong-Viner Envelope Theorem [15].
With purely thermal electricity generation (and with outages assumed away) the
SR supply curve is constant over the cycle, represented by the interval [0; 1]. So—on
the assumption of no start-up or shutdown costs—the SR cost, as well as the LR
cost, is a symmetric (a.k.a. rearrangement-invariant) function of the output bundle
(y (t))t2[0;1]. This means that the production cost, C (y), depends on the values of
y but not on their particular arrangement on [0; 1]. In the language of electricity
suppliers, the cost is a function of the load-duration curve, which mathematically is
the decreasing rearrangement of y (De…nition 5.5). Cost symmetry can serve as a basis
for a more general method of proving price continuity in an equilibrium. This uses a
strong implication of cost symmetry, viz., the similarity of arrangement between the
trajectories of output y and of the supporting price p (Lemma 5.9 with Remark 5.10),
which means that it cannot be that p (t0) < p (t00) and y (t0) > y (t00). With symmetry,
this holds globally, i.e., for any instants t0 and t00 in [0; 1].
A local and weaker condition formalises the notion that a price jump cannot entail
a drop in supply (De…nition 5.11). On the demand side, a slightly stronger condition
means that a price jump must entail a drop in demand (De…nition 6.1). Together,
these conditions rule out a price jump in equilibrium (Theorem 7.2). The assumption
on consumer demand captures more than just the case of additively separable utility,
and thus extends beyond the case of independent demands (Example 6.3). On the
production side, the assumption generalises the symmetric and the additively sepa-
rable cases; and it is weakened further to include technologies such as energy storage
(De…nition 5.14 and Lemma 9.1). In this context our general framework improves on
the method of curves because it applies also with interdependent demands.
1For the pro…t to be di¤erentiable, the price does not have to be a pure density; it su¢ces that
the density part be continuous [11]. This is useful when the price also contains a “singular” part
(see below).
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Although it is motivated by a continuous-time problem, this analysis applies to
a good di¤erentiated by any commodity characteristic that ranges over a topolog-
ical space T which carries an “underlying” measure ¾. (For example, ¾ could be
a probability on a “continuum” of events.) In such a context, quantities of goods
and their values are integrals with respect to (w.r.t.) ¾, and the commodity space
must therefore consist of functions, from T into the real line R, that are integrable,
square-integrable or bounded (depending on the problem); and it must be paired with
a suitable price space. A pair of Lebesgue spaces, L½ and L½
0
with (1=½)+ (1=½0) = 1,
is an example; and the price space L½
0
is the norm-dual of L½ when ½ < +1.
For peak-load pricing the relevant case is that of ½ = +1: the functions repre-
senting commodity bundles must be bounded because the problem involves capacity
costs or constraints. The norm-dual of L1 [0; 1] is larger than L1 [0; 1], and Bewley
[1, p. 516] asserts that the elements of L1¤ n L1 “have no economic interpretation”.
This is a mistaken view because these so-called “price singularities” have an essential
role as capacity charges when the output y 2 L1 [0; 1] has a pointed peak: if the
set ft : y (t) = Sup (y)g has zero Lebesgue measure then the subdi¤erential @ Sup (y)
lies wholly in L1¤ n L1. When the equilibrium allocation actually lies in the smaller
commodity space of continuous R-valued functions, C [0; 1], such a price functional
can be restricted to C and represented by a singular measure. Thus it acquires a
tractable mathematical form and can be used as part of a TOU tari¤. For example,
when the demand for electricity has a …rm pointed peak, a point measure represents
the capacity charge in $ per kW demanded at the peak instant, whilst the fuel charge
is a price density in $/kWh: see [10].
The type of equilibrium which Bewley’s price space L1 [0; 1] does accommodate is
one with the capacity charge spread as a density over a peak plateau in the output.
Such an equilibrium arises if the users’ utility and production functions are Mackey
continuous (which means that consumption is interruptible, i.e., that a brief interrup-
tion causes only a small loss of utility or output): see [12]. For this case we identify
the conditions on which the equilibrium price function, p?, is not only integrable but
also continuous (or, more precisely, has a continuous variant).
Our price continuity result consists, then, in using conditions speci…c to Lebesgue
function spaces (viz., symmetry, additive separability and their generalisations) to
show that the price function’s essential limit exists everywhere on T—in which case
it is “automatically” continuous on T . Thus we combine ideas from the theory of
rearrangements (for functions) with the concept of the essential limit (known from
the theory of stochastic processes, where it is used to prove the continuity of sample
paths). This argument is quite di¤erent from the usual approach to price represen-
tation, which relies on topological assumptions on preferences and production sets
in a commodity space paired with the “target” price space. When the price space is
C (T ), this approach yields an equilibrium existence result for the commodity space of
measuresM (T ), obtained by Jones [18]. This is of interest in commodity di¤erenti-
ation, but it does not apply directly to a good which comes as a ‡ow and can only be
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consumed over time. In such a case an integrable or bounded function can represent
a consumption bundle, but a point measure cannot (since it would mean consuming
a positive amount in literally no time, i.e., at an in…nite rate). It might seem that
there is the possibility of indirect application to the commodity space L1 [0; 1] by
embedding it in M [0; 1]. But even without production, this requires an extension
of preferences from their original domain L1+ [0; 1] to M+ [0; 1]. This is obviously
impossible in the case of a strictly concave, additively separable utility, because such
a function is not continuous for the weak topology w (L1; L1), and a fortiori it can
have no w (M;C)-continuous extension (since C ½ L1): see, e.g., [1, p. 539].2 As
Jones shows by means of a one-consumer example without production [18, Example
4], the equilibrium price density can be discontinuous also when the utility U , on
L1+ [0; 1], is additively separable and the marginal instantaneous utility, at a constant
consumption rate, is continuous or even constant, i.e., when U (x) =
R 1
0
u (x (t)) dt.
He concludes that in “models of commodity di¤erentiation...the computational conve-
nience of additively separable preferences must be abandoned” [18, p. 525]. However,
when L1 [0; 1] is the commodity space, this merely means that, with such preferences,
price continuity cannot be established by embedding L1 inM. Jones’ counterexam-
ple rests on the discontinuity of the initial endowment !, and it does not contradict
our analysis. What it does show is that the embedding approach remains ine¤ective
with any other choice of the topology onM that makes C the continuous dual; the
strongest is the Mackey topology m(M; C). Although a general framework such as
Richard’s [21, Case 1] applies whenever the preferences are continuous and uniformly
proper w.r.t. !,3 these assumptions can only fail with extensions of the additively
separable utility U .4
Since the method of curves does not require a formal vector-space framework, it
is presented …rst (Sections 2 and 3). Commodity and price spaces are introduced in
Section 4. This is followed by a discussion of symmetry and its generalisations, in
Sections 5 and 6. Section 7 gives the general price continuity theorem. The case of
additively separable utility (without cost separability) is spelt out in Section 8 (with
additional results which show that both price and quantity trajectories are continuous
and bounded). The application to electricity pricing with storage (which extends and
2Jones [18, p. 525] also points out that an extendable utility Ur is obtained by averaging the
instantaneous consumption over a small r-neighbourhood of each t. However, price continuity for
such a case is rather obvious because the “moving average” (1=2r)
R t+r
t¡r p (¿) d¿ is always continuous
in t, for every integrable p.
3Richard’s Case 2 does not apply to the commodity spaceM [0; 1] because no topology makes it
a locally convex (topological) vector lattice.
4Even if U had an m(M; C)-continuous extension to M+ [0; 1], it could not be !0-uniformly
proper w.r.t. any !0, for if it were, it would also be so w.r.t. any !00 ¸ !0, and by Richard’s result
this would imply the existence of an equilibrium price p? 2 C with !00 as the endowment. But if
!00 is chosen to be discontinuous on [0; 1] as in Jones’ example, then p? (t) = (du=dx) (!00 (t)) is also
discontinuous. (It is also obvious that U cannot have a continuous extension to all ofM, since if it
did then rU (x) would always be in C, which is not the case when x is discontinuous.)
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supersedes Section 3) comes in Section 9. Appendix A reviews the concept of essential
value (or limit). Appendix B reviews some properties of continuous functions.
2. Peak-load pricing with cross-price independent demands
The simplest model of equilibrium consists of supply and demand curves S and
D in the price-quantity plane; and if one or both curves vary continuously with
a parameter such as time, then so does their intersection point. This observation
is useful in continuous-time peak-load pricing, i.e., pricing a cyclically demanded
good which is produced by one or more techniques with capacity costs (in addition
to variable costs). In this context a continuous price can serve as an equilibrium
solution to the problem of demand jumps caused by discontinuous switches from one
price rate to another in a TOU tari¤. A local demand maximum arises on the wrong
side of such an instant, viz., just after a price drop (or just before a price jump). For
example, the introduction of a two-rate tari¤ usually results in a surge of demand
just after the switch from the daytime rate to the night-time rate: see, e.g., [20, pp.
65–66 with Figure 2.2]. Since this is a typical example, the cyclically priced ‡ow in
question is henceforth referred to as electricity, although the model applies to other
goods as well.
With a one-station technology, the long-run marginal cost (LRMC) tari¤ has the
form p?LR (t) = w + r°
? (t), where r is the unit capacity cost, w is the unit running
cost, and °? (with
R
°? (t) dt = 1) is the distribution of the capacity charge, which
is concentrated on the (global) maxima of the LR equilibrium output y?LR. To keep
demand constant during the peak, the price varies continuously with time. With
a multi-station technology the tari¤ structure is more complex: the o¤peak price
varies between the lowest and the highest of the unit variable costs of the various
station types. Marginal cost pricing means that the o¤peak price is the generating
system’s marginal variable cost, i.e., the unit fuel cost of the marginal station on line.
(In the long run the system must also be optimal, i.e., it must minimise the total
cost of meeting the demand.) Thus the marginalist principle might appear to imply
discontinuous price changes: with, say, a two-station technology with variable costs
w1 < w2 it seems that the price must drop from w2 to w1 as soon as the demand (at
price w2) has fallen to k1, the capacity of the …rst, base type. But the users’ response
to such a sudden price drop is likely to reverse, albeit temporarily, the downward trend
of demand—in which case, to meet the demand at the price w1, the second station
must immediately be switched back on, and the marginal fuel cost increases back to
w2. This undermines the tari¤ because the ruling price, w1, di¤ers from the marginal
cost. And if the tari¤ is revised to take account of the new demand trajectory, new
price discontinuities are created, so the di¢culty arises afresh. As we show, there is
nevertheless an equilibrium solution which consists in lowering the price gradually,
from w2 to w1, to keep the demand constant and equal to k1 for a time after the peak
station has been switched o¤. The price keeps falling just enough to maintain the
demand (which would fall below k1 if the price were kept constant at w2). After the
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transition period the price “freezes” at w1, and demand starts falling again. Price and
quantity move alternately (along the vertical and horizontal segments of the supply
curve in Figure 1a), i.e., the price and output trajectories have alternating plateaux:
see Figures 1b and 1d.5 Thus price continuity implies that, in addition to the peak
plateau, the output has o¤peak plateaux during which the price changes from w2 to
w1 and vice versa.
In practice a continuous price change could be approximated by a number of small
price jumps. A cruder but e¤ective device is to stagger a price drop by timing it
di¤erently for di¤erent consumers. For example, since 1977 Electricité de France has
spread the onset of its night-time rate over one and a half hours;6 each consumer is
noti…ed of his particular night period but is given no choice in the matter. Since the
e¤ect on market demand is akin to facing the “average consumer” with a price varying
between the two rates, this can be viewed as a rough implementation, workable even
with two-rate or three-rate meters, of the exact pure pricing solution.
With a cross-price independent demand for electricity and a purely thermal gener-
ating technology, the method of supply and demand curves applies directly to the SR
equilibrium, and it extends to the LR equilibrium by the SR approach. The perfectly
competitive SR supply curve depends on the generating capacities (kµ) and their unit
running costs (wµ), where µ = 1; : : : ;£ are the various station types. If the current
electricity price is p, then the supply from station type µ is: Sµ (p) = 0 for p < wµ,
Sµ (p) = kµ for p > wµ, and Sµ (p) = [0; kµ] for p = wµ (in which case Sµ (p) is multi-
valued). The total supply is STh (p) =
P£
µ=1 Sµ (p). For, say, £ = 2 with w1 < w2,
the total supply from a two-station thermal system k = (k1; k2) is
STh (p) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
0 for p < w1
[0; k1] for p = w1
k1 if w1 < p < w2
[k1; k1 + k2] for p = w2
k1 + k2 for p > w2
(2.1)
(Figure 1a). This is, of course, the supply schedule of a producer whose SR cost is
additively separable over the cycle [0; T ]; here
CSR (y (¢)) =
Z T
0
cSR (y (t)) dt(2.2)
5The graphs in Figures 1b and 1d are not periodic. They can be thought of in two ways: either as
representing only a part of the cycle, or as representing the whole cycle, but after a rearrangement of
time which produces nonincreasing price- and load-duration curves (and which exists by Lemma 5.9
and Remark 5.7).
6With a uniformly timed night-time rate, the EdF’s experience in 1976 was that demand would
surge, just after the start of the low rate, by over 3GW (ca. 7% of maximum demand).
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with cSR (y) =
R y
0
S¡1Th (y) dy (Figure 1c). The demand Dt (p) is, at any time t, a
function of the current price alone. It can be interpreted as the demand of a household
maximising the utility function
U (x (¢) ;m) = m+
Z T
0
u (t; x (t)) dt
over x (¢) ¸ 0 and m ¸ 0 subject to the budget constraint m+ R T
0
p (t)x (t) dt ·M ,
where M is the income and p (¢) is a TOU price in terms of the numeraire (which
represents all other goods and thus closes the model). With this behaviour, the equi-
librium price can be expressed in terms of marginal utility and thus shown to be
continuous in t if @u=@x is continuous. For each t the instantaneous utility u (t; x) is
taken to be a strictly concave, increasing and di¤erentiable function of the consump-
tion rate x 2 R+, with (@u=@x) (t; 0) > w1 (to ensure that the SR equilibrium demand
is positive at every t, if k1 > 0). For simplicity all demand is assumed to come from a
single household. Its income M is the sum of an endowment of the numeraire (mEn)
and the pure pro…t from electricity sales, i.e.,
M = mEn +
2X
µ=1
µZ T
0
(p (t)¡ wµ)+ dt¡ rµ
¶
¢ kµ
where r1 and r2 are the unit capacity costs (per cycle), and ¼+ = max f¼; 0g is the
nonnegative part of ¼. To guarantee a positive demand for the numeraire, assume
that mEn >
P2
µ=1 (Twµ + rµ) kµ. Then at any time t the demand depends only on the
current price p (t), and it is determined from the equation
@u
@x
(t; x (t)) = p (t) :
(In other words, Dt (p) = ((@u=@x) (t; ¢))¡1 (p).) When w2 · (@u=@x) (t; k1 + k2), this
value of @u=@x is the price needed to equate demand to k1 + k2. Similarly, when
w1 · (@u=@x) (t; k1) · w2, the middle term is the price needed to equate demand to
k1. So the SR equilibrium price can be given as
p?SR (t) = w1 +min
(
w2 ¡ w1;
µ
@u
@x
(t; k1)¡ w1
¶+)
+
µ
@u
@x
(t; k1 + k2)¡ w2
¶+(2.3)
which is continuous in t if @u=@x is (for any …xed x > 0). If additionally w1 >
mint (@u=@x) (t; k1) and w2 < maxt (@u=@x) (t; k1), then the times t with p?SR (t) be-
tween w1 and w2 (and with the equilibrium output equal to k1) form a set of positive
measure.7 With k2 > 0, this is an o¤peak plateau in the output (Figure 1d).
7Note that meas ft : w1 < (@u=@x) (t; k1) < w2g > 0 because this set is nonempty and open.
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The LR equilibrium is obtained from the SR equilibrium by solving the simultane-
ous equations rµ =
R T
0
(p?SR (t; k1; k2)¡ wµ)+ dt for k and putting the solution k? into
p?SR (t; k).
8
Figure 1. Short-run equilibrium of supply and (cross-price indepen-
dent) demand for thermally generated electricity: (a) determination of
the price and output for each instant t; (b) and (d) the trajectories of
price and output; (c) the SR cost curve (the integral of S w.r.t. y).
The SR price formula (2.3) extends to the case of any number, £, of stations. Also,
no inequalities between the wµ’s need be assumed. This is useful when wµ depends on
time, and there may be no …xed merit order among the stations. Denote by w" 2 R£
the nondecreasing rearrangement of the vector w = (wµ)
£
µ=1 2 R£ (i.e., w"1 is the
smallest entry in w, w"2 is the second smallest, and so on). In these terms
p?SR (t) = w
"
1 (t) +
£¡1X
µ=1
min
8<:³w"µ+1 (t)¡ w"µ (t)´ ;
0@@u
@x
0@t; X
®:w®(t)·w"µ (t)
k®
1A¡ w"µ (t)
1A+9=;
(2.4)
8In the case of a corner solution with k2 = 0, only the inequality r2 ¸
R T
0
(p?SR ¡w2)+ dt holds.
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+Ã
@u
@x
Ã
t;
£X
µ=1
kµ
!
¡ w"£ (t)
!+
:
3. Peak-load pricing with storage and independent demands
In addition to eliminating demand jumps, price continuity is useful for the problem
of operating and valuing storage facilities for cyclically priced goods. In the context
of electricity this applies to hydroelectric and pumped-storage plants. Here we deal
with pumped storage (PS); the case of hydro is similar. Unlike a thermal plant,
a storage plant has two capital inputs, viz., the reservoir capacity kSt (in kWh)
and the conversion capacity kCo (in kW) which transforms the stored energy into
electricity and vice versa. (For a more detailed description of the technology, see [16]
and Section 9 here.) On the basis of operating-pro…t maximisation, given a TOU
electricity price p and the plant’s capacities kPS = (kSt; kCo), the stock of energy can
be assigned a TOU shadow price Ã (t), which—as we show in [16]—is unique if p (t)
is continuous in t. In general there is a set of such stock prices ª^ (p; kPS), but it has
just one element, Ã^ (p; kPS), if p is continuous. It then follows that the capacities,
and in the case of hydro also the river ‡ow river ‡ow ([13] and [14]), have de…nite
and separate marginal values. This underlines the importance of price continuity in
general equilibrium.
In terms of any Ã 2 ª^ (p; kPS), the storage plant’s optimal output rate y (t) can
be given as in (3.1) below: y (t) = §kCo if p (t) 6= Ã (t), with y (t) 2 [¡kCo; kCo] if
p (t) = Ã (t). For each t this de…nes the plant’s supply curve SPS;t in the price-quantity
plane, but the curve is not cross-price independent because it depends on Ã (t), which
depends on the whole function p. This means that, with a combined generation and
storage system, the SR equilibrium price cannot be found by intersecting curves as
in the purely thermal case. Nevertheless, if p?SR is an equilibrium tari¤, and St is the
system’s supply curve constructed from kµ, wµ, kCo and a Ã 2 ª^ (p?SR; kPS), then—for
a certain choice, Ã?SR, of Ã—the curve St intersects the demand curve Dt at p
?
SR (t).
This fact can still be used to show that p?SR is continuous, although the argument
requires an extra step, which is to show that Ã?SR (t) is continuous in t (and hence
that St varies continuously with t). Once Ã
?
SR is known to be continuous, continuity
of p?SR follows, as in the purely thermal case, from (2.4), which is now applied with
£+1 instead of £ and with w£+1 (t) := Ã
?
SR (t). (It also follows that Ã
?
SR = Ã^ (p
?
SR).)
Continuity of Ã?SR is next deduced from equilibrium conditions and two properties
of every Ã 2 ª^, viz., (i) that Ã is of bounded variation, so it has the two one-sided
limits Ã (t§),9 and (ii) that Ã rises or falls (possibly with a jump or a drop) only
when the reservoir is full or empty, respectively. Consider a system with, say, two
thermal stations as in (2.1) and one storage station (with conversion capacity kCo).
9Since the set of t’s with Ã (t¡) 6= Ã (t+) is at most countable, it does not matter which of the
two values is chosen for Ã (t) itself.
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With p?SR and Ã
?
SR abbreviated to p
? and Ã?, introduce the curve
SPS;t (p) =
8><>>:
¡kCo for p < Ã? (t)
[¡kCo; kCo] for p = Ã? (t)
kCo for p > Ã
? (t)
(3.1)
and add it to the STh of (2.1) to form
St (p) = STh (p) + SPS;t (p) :
For every t, this curve intersects Dt at p? (t). When p? (t) = Ã? (t), the rate of
equilibrium output from storage can be read o¤ as the horizontal distance from the
intersection point to the centre of the horizontal segment of length 2kCo which St has
at the price Ã? (t): see Figure 2. As the point is, respectively, left or right of centre,
so the output is negative or positive, i.e., the reservoir is being charged or discharged.
Figure 2. Proof of continuity of short-run equilibrium price for elec-
tricity supplied by a combined generation-and-storage system: the en-
ergy stock price Ã? cannot be discontinuous if the (cross-price indepen-
dent) demand curve Dt is strictly decreasing; and if Ã? (t) is continuous
in t, then so is the supply curve St and hence also p? (t).
Suppose that Ã? has a jump at some t, i.e., Ã? (t¡) < Ã? (t+). Say there is no
wµ between Ã
? (t¡) and Ã? (t+). (If there is, it only helps the argument.) Figure 2
shows the case of £ = 2 with w1 < Ã
? (t¡) < Ã? (t+) < w2; the curve given by
(2.1) plus (3.1) with Ã? (t¡) or Ã? (t+) in place of Ã? (t) is denoted by St¡ or St+.
Now note that Dt cannot intersect St+ below Ã? (t+) or to the left of centre of the
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horizontal segment at the level Ã? (t+), since this would mean that the reservoir is
being charged for a time just after t, which is infeasible because the reservoir is full
at t.10 Similarly, Dt cannot intersect St¡ above Ã? (t¡) or to the right of centre of
the horizontal segment at the level Ã? (t¡), since this would mean that the reservoir
is being discharged for a time just before t, which is again infeasible. (In Figure 2,
the lines that Dt cannot intersect are the heavy lines.) So, being monotone, Dt must
have a vertical segment, from the centre at level Ã? (t+) to the centre at level Ã? (t¡).
But such a vertical segment contradicts the strict monotonicity of Dt in p, i.e., the
di¤erentiability of u (t; ¢). This shows that Ã? is continuous, and hence so is p?.
In Section 9, the continuity of p? and Ã^ (p?) is re-derived in a di¤erent way, and
in the other order: …rst it is proved for p? by applying Theorem 7.2. And if p is
continuous then so is Ã^ (p)—see [11].11
4. Commodity and price spaces for a general framework
The method of curves is limited to the case of independent demands (Sections 2
and 3). A more general price continuity result can be based on the same idea, viz.,
that a price jump would cause oppositely signed discontinuities in the supply and
demand trajectories. The resulting demand drop must be nonzero to include the case
when supply does not actually jump but does not drop either (as in Figure 1a, where
y stays at k1 if p jumps from w1 to w2). For a general result (Theorem 7.2), such
properties are simply assumed. We name them sub-symmetry and quasi-symmetry of
preferences and technologies, since these properties follow from the stronger condition
of symmetry, i.e., invariance under rearrangement. A function C of (y (t))t2[0;T ] is
symmetric (a.k.a. rearrangement-invariant) if C (y) depends only on the distribution
of y w.r.t. the Lebesgue measure on [0; T ].12 For example, the SR cost of thermal
electricity generation, CSR of (2.2), is symmetric. (So is the LR cost, which is not
additively separable like CSR.) When C is convex, its symmetry ensures that y and
p = rC (y) are similarly arranged, i.e., that for (almost) every t0 and t00 if p (t0) < p (t00)
then y (t0) · y (t00): see [9, Theorem 1].
Applied to a joint cost as a function of the output trajectory y, this means that
outputs are always higher (or at least not lower) at higher-priced times. In other
words, price and output increments do not have opposite signs anywhere on [0; T ].
This is a global price-output relationship; and its full strength is not necessary in
proving price continuity, which is a local property of the equilibrium price function
p?: [0; T ]! R. A local and approximate relationship between the quantities and the
supporting prices su¢ces. This is sub-symmetry (De…nition 5.11). On the produc-
tion side the assumption is further weakened to quasi-symmetry (De…nition 5.14), to
10Continuity of Dt over t is used here.
11Obviously this cannot be used to derive the continuity of p?, as in this section, from the
continuity of Ã?.
12Equivalently, C is symmetric if C (y) = C (y ± ½) for every Lebesgue measure-preserving trans-
formation ½: [0; T ]! [0; T ].
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make it hold for energy storage (Lemma 9.1). On the consumption side the assump-
tion is slightly strengthened (De…nition 6.1). It is veri…ed for additively separable
utility (Example 6.2). Given Lemma 9.1, this re-establishes the result of Section 3.
Extensions to other forms of utility are sketched (Example 6.3).
Such an analysis requires the framework of a dual pair of commodity and price
spaces. In peak-load pricing an output bundle is always bounded by productive
capacity, so the commodity space is L1 [0; T ]. It is paired with L1 [0; T ] as the price
space; but the task is to show that the equilibrium price density p? is continuous (and
not just integrable) on [0; T ]. Before this application, T denotes an abstract set of
commodities which carries a topology with a countable base of open sets. Additionally
T carries a …nite nonatomic (and nonnegative) measure ¾ on a sigma-algebra A that
contains all the Borel subsets of T . Every nonempty open subset of T is assumed to
be ¾-nonnull, i.e., to have a positive measure. The vector space of all (¾-equivalence
classes of)A-measurable real-valued functions on T is denoted by L0 (T; ¾). The space
of all ¾-essentially bounded functions, L1 (T ), is paired with L1 (T ), the space of all
¾-integrable functions. (The analysis can be adapted for use with other L½-spaces in
problems involving unbounded commodity bundles.)
Apart from T (which may represent a single di¤erentiated good), there is a …-
nite number of homogeneous goods numbered by 1, 2; : : : ; G ¸ 0. So a complete
commodity bundle is an (x;m) 2 L1 (T ) £ RG, and its value at a price system
(p; r) 2 L1 (T )£ RG is R
T
p (t)x (t)¾ (dt) + r ¢m, abbreviated to hp; xi+ r ¢m.
5. Symmetry and weaker conditions on production sets
The idea that a jump in the price trajectory cannot coincide with a drop in the
supply trajectory is next developed. First this is shown to follow from the symmetry of
the cost function (or of the input correspondence when the inputs are not aggregated
into a scalar cost). Actually symmetry implies a stronger “similarity” between the
price and output trajectories, viz., that they rise and fall simultaneously (Lemma 5.9).
This is more than is needed for price continuity, but the assumption is too strong for
some applications: in electricity pricing the storage cost is not symmetric (although
the thermal cost is). The similarity condition is therefore weakened (De…nitions 5.11,
5.14 and 5.17). Like symmetry, the weaker properties are preserved in the summation
of production sets. Some “general” examples meeting the weak conditions are given
at this stage, but the motivating example of energy storage is studied in Section 9
(Lemmas 9.1 and 9.3).
De…nition 5.1. A function C on L0 (T ) is ¾-symmetric (a.k.a. rearrangement-inva-
riant) if its value depends only on the distribution of its argument, w.r.t. ¾. (In other
words, C is symmetric if the condition ¾ (y¡1 (B)) = ¾ (z¡1 (B)) for every Borel set
B ½ R implies that C (y) = C (z).)
De…nition 5.2. A set S ½ L0 (T ) is ¾-symmetric if its indicator function is sym-
metric, i.e., if z 2 S whenever z has the same distribution, w.r.t. ¾, as some
11
y 2 S. (In other words, S is symmetric if the conditions: y 2 S, z 2 L0 and
¾ (y¡1 (B)) = ¾ (z¡1 (B)) for every Borel set B ½ R imply that z 2 S also.)
This concept is used with S equal to the section of a production set Y ½L1 (T )£RG
through a q 2 RG, i.e., with S equal to the q-restricted production set
Y (q) := fy 2 L1 (T ) : (y; q) 2 Yg :(5.1)
The set of “output” bundles Y (q) is symmetric for each “input” q 2 RG if and only if
the “input requirement” set Yy := fq : (y; q) 2 Yg depends only on the distribution
of y (w.r.t. ¾). In such a case the cost
C (y) := inf
q
f¡ hr; qi : (y; q) 2 Yg
is a symmetric function of y (for each input price system r 2 RG).
For the purpose of proving price continuity on T , the relevant implication of symme-
try is the similarity of arrangement for the functions p and y (on T ) which represent,
respectively, a price system and an output bundle that maximises the (q-restricted)
pro…t on S = Y (q). This result (Lemma 5.9) is preceded by a discussion of the
similarity concept, introduced (for functions) by Day [3, p. 932].
De…nition 5.3. Two elements, p and y, of L0 (T ) are similarly arranged if, for any
measurable sets A0 and A00,13
ess sup
A0
p < ess inf
A00
p) ess sup
A0
y · ess inf
A00
y:(5.2)
With p and y replaced by any of their variants p¸ and y¸—which are literally func-
tions rather than classes of almost everywhere (a.e.) equal functions—similarity of
arrangement can also be de…ned in terms of values at any points t0 and t00 (instead of
values on nonnull sets A0 and A00).
Remark 5.4. Two elements, p and y, of L0 (T ) are similarly arranged if and only if
p (t0) < p (t00)) y (t0) · y (t00)
for ¾-almost every (a.e.) t0 and t00 in T—i.e., if and only if for any variants p¸ and y¸
(of p and y) there is a ¾-null set Z such that for every t0 and t00 in T n Z
p¸ (t0) < p¸ (t00)) y¸ (t0) · y¸ (t00) :(5.3)
Proof. To show that (5.3) implies (5.2), take any measurable sets A0 and A00 satisfying
the antecedent of (5.2). There exist null sets Z 0 and Z 00 (which generally depend on
A0 and A00) such that
sup
A0nZ0
p¸ = ess sup
A0
p < ess inf
A00
p = inf
A00nZ00
p¸:
13It obviously su¢ces to verify this for any ¾-almost disjoint pair of ¾-nonnull sets, A0 and A00.
(If ¾ (A) = 0 then ess supA y = ¡1 and ess infA y = +1. So, in De…nition 5.3, if A0 or A00 is null
then the consequent holds, for any y. And if ¾ (A0 \A00) > 0 then the antecedent fails, for any p.)
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One can assume that Z 0 ¶ Z and Z 00 ¶ Z (by replacing Z 0 and Z 00 with Z 0 [ Z and
Z 00 [ Z).14 By (5.3), applied to every t0 2 A0 n Z 0 and t00 2 A00 n Z 00, it follows that
ess sup
A0
y · sup
A0nZ0
y¸ · inf
A00nZ00
y¸ · ess inf
A00
y
as required.
To show that, conversely, (5.2) implies (5.3), …x any variants p¸ and y¸, and let Z be
a null set (to be speci…ed later). Given any t0 and t00 in T nZ with p¸ (t0) < p¸ (t00), take
any % and % from Q (the set of all rational numbers) such that p¸ (t0) < % < % < p¸ (t00),
and de…ne
A0 :=
©
t 2 T : p¸ (t) < %ª(5.4)
A00 := ft 2 T : % < p¸ (t)g :(5.5)
Since
ess sup
A0
p · % < % · ess inf
A00
p
it follows from (5.2) that
ess sup
A0
y · ess inf
A00
y:
Once Z is chosen to ensure that
sup
A0nZ
y¸ = ess sup
A0
y and ess inf
A00
y = inf
A00nZ
y¸(5.6)
it will follow (since t0 2 A0 n Z and t00 2 A00 n Z) that
y¸ (t0) · sup
A0nZ
y¸ · inf
A00nZ
y¸ · y¸ (t00)(5.7)
as required. To complete the argument, for each % 2 Q de…ne A0% and A00% as in (5.4)
and (5.5) but with % instead of the % or %, and take two null sets Z 0% and Z
00
% such
that: (i) the (ordinary) supremum of y¸ on A0% n Z 0% equals the essential supremum of
y on A0%, and (ii) the (ordinary) in…mum of y¸ on A
00
% nZ 00% equals the essential in…mum
of y on A00%. De…ne
Z :=
[
%2Q
¡
Z 0% [ Z 00%
¢
:
This set is a null set that depends on p¸ and y¸; and it has the required property (5.6)
because A0 = A0% and A
00 = A00%.
15
14One can also choose Z0 to ensure that the essential range of p on A0 equals cl p¸ (A0 n Z0), etc.
15This proof shows indirectly, by using A0 nZ 6= ; 6= A00 nZ to establish (5.6) and (5.7), that both
A0 and A00 are nonnull. This can also be seen directly: for any %, if (say) A0% is null then Z0% must
equal A0%. In other words, removing the set Z removes all the null sets of the form ft : p¸ (t) < %g
or ft : % < p¸ (t)g, with a rational %. So the essential extrema of p (on T ) are equal to the ordinary
extrema of p¸ on T n Z. For comparison, if all the null sets of the form ft : %1 < p¸ (t) < %2g, with
13
Similarity of arrangement is equivalent to the existence of a common ranking pat-
tern, as is shown by Day [3, p. 939, 5.6]. To state this, we …rst introduce the concepts.
De…nition 5.5. The nonincreasing rearrangement y# of a y 2 L0 (T; ¾) is the non-
increasing function on [0; ¾ (T )] with the same distribution, relative to meas (the
Lebesgue measure), as that of y w.r.t. ¾.16
De…nition 5.6. A ranking pattern of a y 2 L0 (T; ¾) is any measure-preserving map
½: T ! [0; ¾ (T )] such that y = y# ± ½; the set of all such maps is denoted by R (y).17
Comments:
1. That R (y) 6= ; (if ¾ is nonatomic) is the Lorentz-Ry¤ Lemma [24, Lemma 1],
stated also in, e.g., [4, 3.3].
2. If y has no plateau (i.e., ¾ ft : y (t) = yg = 0 for each y 2 R or, equivalently, y#
is strictly decreasing), then the pattern of y is unique, and it is ½y = (y#)
¡1 ± y.
Note that
½y (t) = ¾ f¿ 2 T : y (¿ ) ¸ y (t)g
i.e., ½y (t) =¾ (T ) is t’s “percentage above” (the fraction of T on which y is above
y (t)). Thus ½y ranks the elements of T by the value of y.
Remark 5.7 (Day). Assume that ¾ is nonatomic (on A). Two functions p and y,
in L0 (T;A; ¾), are similarly arranged if and only if
R (p) \R (y) 6= ;(5.8)
i.e., if and only if both p = p# ± ½ and y = y# ± ½ for some measure-preserving map
½: T ! [0; ¾ (T )].
Comments:
1. It is obvious that (5.8) implies (5.3) and, equivalently, (5.2). To prove the
converse—that (5.2) implies (5.8)—Day [3, p. 939, 5.6] extends the Lorentz-
Ry¤ Lemma to pairs (and n-tuples) of functions, and adds an argument which
yields another equivalent condition.
2. In (5.2) and (5.3), the inequalities in the antecedent and the consequent must
be strict and nonstrict, respectively.
3. As is obvious from Remark 5.4 (or Remark 5.7), similarity of arrangement is a
symmetric binary relation (in L0)—i.e., p and y can be interchanged in (5.2) or
(5.3).18 It is not a transitive relation (since every function is arranged similarly
to a constant).
rational %1 and %2, were removed from T , then the range of p¸ on the remainder of T would be dense
in the essential range of p on T (de…ned as the smallest closed set E µ R with ¾ ft : p (t) =2 Eg = 0).
16When y is the output and p is a TOU tari¤, the graphs of y# and p# are known in electricity
pricing as the load- and price-duration curves. On L1, the operation x 7! x# is m
¡
L1; L1
¢
-
continuous: see [7].
17“Measure-preserving” means that ¾
¡
½¡1 (B)
¢
= measB for every Borel set B ½ [0; ¾ (T )].
18This can also be shown directly from De…nition 5.3.
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Similarity of arrangement is preserved in summation.
Remark 5.8. If each of two functions, y and z, is arranged similarly to p, then so
is y + z.
Proof. This follows from, e.g., De…nition 5.3 and the inequalities
ess sup
A0
(y + z) · ess sup
A0
y + ess sup
A0
z(5.9)
ess inf
A00
y + ess inf
A00
z · ess inf
A00
(y + z)(5.10)
for every y and z.
As has been mentioned, if p represents a linear functional supporting a symmetric
set S at a point y, then p and y are similarly arranged (or, equivalently, have a
common pattern). This is next spelt out for the case of p 2 L1 and y 2 S ½ L1.
(The same holds for L½ and L½
0
instead of L1 and L1.)
Lemma 5.9. Assume that the measure ¾ is nonatomic (on A) and that S is a sym-
metric subset of L1 (T;A; ¾). If p 2 L1 (T ) and y maximises hp; ¢i on S—i.e., y 2 S
and hp; yi = sup fhp; zi : z 2 Sg—then p and y are similarly arranged.
Proof. It su¢ces to show that hp; yi ¸ hp#; y#i, which is the reverse of the Hardy-
Littlewood-Pólya Inequality, and then to apply Day’s characterisation of the case of
equality [3, 5.2, pp. 937–938].19 To this end, since ¾ is nonatomic, take any ½ 2 Rp
(i.e., p = p# ± ½). Since S is symmetric, y# ± ½ 2 S; so
hp; yi ¸ hp; y# ± ½i = hp# ± ½; y# ± ½i = hp#; y#i
(since ½ is measure-preserving). So hp; yi = hp#; y#i, and Day’s result shows that
R (p) \R (y) 6= ;.
Comment: In the Proof of Lemma 5.9, ½ is a pattern of p but not of y, in general.
If, however, p has no plateau, then it has a single pattern, and so ½ must be the
common pattern of p and y.
The corresponding result for functions follows [9, Theorem 1].
Remark 5.10. If ¾ is nonatomic, C: L1 (T; ¾)! R is a symmetric convex function
and p 2 @C (y)\L1 (T; ¾), i.e., a p 2 L1 is a subgradient of C at y, then p and y are
similarly arranged.
Applied to a (restricted) production set S = Y (q), Lemma 5.9 shows that, in an
output bundle y 2 S ½ L1 (T ) and a supporting price system p 2 L1 (T ), the quantity
and price move up and down together over “time”. For the purpose of proving price
continuity, a weaker property su¢ces.
Notation: The set of all neighbourhoods of t is denoted by N (t).
19The inequality is: hp; yi · hp#; y#i, with equality if and only if p and y are similarly arranged.
This is a special case of [3, 5.2], for ' (x1; x2) = x1x2.
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De…nition 5.11. A set S ½ L1 (T ) is sub-symmetric if:
For every p 2 L1 (T ) and every y that maximises hp; ¢i on S, and for every t 2 T and
² > 0, there exists an H 2 N (t) such that for any two measurable sets A0 ½ H and
A00 ½ H
²+ ess sup
A0
p < ess inf
A00
p ) ess sup
A0
y · ess inf
A00
y:(5.11)
Equivalently,20 for every p, y, t and ² such as above, there exists an H 2 N (t) such
that, for ¾-almost every (a.e.) t0 and t00 in H,
²+ p (t0) < p (t00)) y (t0) · y (t00) :(5.12)
Comments:
1. The p and y in (5.12) must of course be interpreted as (any) variants p¸ and y¸,
as in (5.3). The phrase “for a.e. t0 and t00 in H” is also to be interpreted as
in Remark 5.4—viz., as meaning “for every t0 and t00 in H but outside of some
¾-null set Z ”. The excepted set Z depends on the choice of variants p¸ and y¸
(but it can be chosen independently of ²).
2. Unlike the case of a symmetric S (in which p and y are similarly arranged by
Lemma 5.9), with a sub-symmetric S the relationship between p and y is not
symmetric—i.e., p and y cannot be interchanged in (5.11) or (5.12).
3. Because of the ², the strict inequality between the values of p in the antecedent
of (5.11) or (5.12) can be made nonstrict without changing the concept. But the
inequality between the values of y in the consequent of (5.11) or (5.12) must be
non-strict, as in (5.2) or (5.3).
4. Every symmetric set is sub-symmetric: by Lemma 5.9 (and De…nition 5.3), to
satisfy (5.11) it su¢ces to set H = T (regardless of ²).
A proper example of sub-symmetry in production is the additively separable convex
cost function
R
T
c (t; y (t)) dt: it is not symmetric unless the “instantaneous” cost is
independent of t directly (i.e., unless the integrand c (t; y) is actually independent
of t, as in (2.2)). But if the cost curve c (t; ¢), together with its y-derivative, varies
continuously with t, then it can be approximated in a neighbourhood of any t0 2 T
by the …xed (time-independent) curve c (t0; ¢). This is why
R
c (t; y (t)) dt is “locally
and approximately” symmetric—i.e., sub-symmetric.
Example 5.12. Assume that c: T £ (¡1; k] ! R, where k 2 R is a constant, is
a di¤erentiable convex integrand, i.e., the function t 7! c (t; y) is ¾-integrable on T
(for every y 2 R), and that the function y 7! c (t; y) is convex and di¤erentiable on
(¡1; k], for every t 2 T . Then
C (y) :=
Z
T
c (t; y (t)) ¾ (dt)(5.13)
is a convex integral functional on L1 (T ), de…ned e¤ectively for y · k: see, e.g., [22].
20The equivalence of (5.11) to (5.12) can be proved in the same way as Remark 5.4.
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If additionally @c=@y is (jointly) continuous on T £ (¡1; k] then, for any m 2 R,
the set
S = fy 2 L1 (T ) : C (y) · mg(5.14)
is sub-symmetric, provided that C (y) < m for some y (Slater’s Condition).
Comments:
1. (@c=@y) (t; k) means the left (one-sided) derivative (w.r.t. y, at y = k), which is
assumed to be …nite. If there were no capacity constraint k, then c (t; ¢) might
be de…ned on R instead of (¡1; k]. Example 5.12 extends to that case.
2. With c di¤erentiable in y on (¡1; k), a strict inequality holds between the
values of y in (5.12), except when y (t0) = y (t00) = k. The exception is caused
by the kink which c (t; ¢) has at y = k (where the curve is “cut o¤” by setting
c (t; y) = +1 for y > k): see (5.16).
3. When a negative y (t) can arise only from free disposal, the “instantaneous”
production cost c (t; y) is nondecreasing in y, with c (t; y) = 0 for y · 0. And
c (t; ¢) can have a kink at y = 0 without spoiling the result (just as it has a kink
at y = k), i.e., Example 5.12 extends to the case of (@c=@y) (t; 0+) > 0.
4. For (5.12) to hold as it is, the y-coordinate of any kinks in c (t; ¢) must be
independent of t, as in the above cases of y = k or 0. If the inequality y (t0) ·
y (t00) in (5.12) were relaxed to y (t0) · y (t00) + ², then Example 5.12 could be
generalised to the case of any convex c (t; ¢) with a subdi¤erential @yc (t; y) that
is continuous in t (as a correspondence).
Proof of Example 5.12. Take any t 2 T , ² > 0, p 2 L1 (T ) and y that maximises hp; ¢i
on S. There exists a scalar ¹ ¸ 0 such that21
p (¿ ) = ¹
@c
@y
(¿ ; y (¿)) for ¾-almost every ¿ 2 T with y (¿ ) < k(5.15)
p (¿ ) ¸ ¹@c
@y
(¿ ; k) for ¾-almost every ¿ 2 T with y (¿ ) = k:(5.16)
If ¹ > 0 then, by Corollary B.2 applied toM = ¡¹@c=@y,22 there exists an H 2 N (t)
such that: for every t0 and t00 in H and every y0 and y00 in [EssInf (y) ;EssSup (y)] ½
(¡1; k]
y0 > y00 ) @c
@y
(t0; y0) ¸ @c
@y
(t0; y00) ¸ @c
@y
(t00; y00)¡ ²
¹
:
From this and (5.15)–(5.16), for a.e. t0 and t00 in H,
y (t0) > y (t00)) p (t0) ¸ ¹@c
@y
(t0; y (t0)) ¸ ¹@c
@y
(t00; y (t00))¡ ² = p (t00)¡ ²:
21This is where Slater’s Condition is used.
22Here it su¢ces to use the partial continuity of @c=@y in t, which holds uniformly in y.
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In other words, for a.e. t0 and t00 in H,
²+ p (t0) < p (t00)) y (t0) · y (t00)
which proves (5.12).
Finally, if ¹ = 0 then p (t00) > p (t0) implies that y (t00) = k ¸ y (t0), as required.
This example is next reoriented for application to an industrial customer using a
di¤erentiated input z = ¡y 2 L1+ (T ) to produce a quantity
R
T
f (t; z (t)) dt of a
homogeneous output good.
Example 5.13. Assume that f : T £ R+ ! R is a di¤erentiable concave integrand,
i.e., the function t 7! f (t; z) is ¾-integrable on T (for every z 2 R), whilst the function
z 7! f (t; z) is concave and di¤erentiable on R+.23 Then
F (z) :=
Z
T
f (t; z (t))¾ (dt)(5.17)
is a concave integral functional on L1+ (T ): see, e.g., [22].
If additionally @f=@z is (jointly) continuous on T £ R+ then, for any ' 2 R, the
set
S =
©¡z 2 L1¡ (T ) : F (z) ¸ 'ª(5.18)
is sub-symmetric, provided that F (z) > ' for some z (Slater’s Condition).
Comment: With f taken to be di¤erentiable in z on R+, a strict inequality holds
between the values of z in (5.12), except when z (t0) = z (t00) = 0. The exception is
caused by the kink which f (t; ¢) has at z = 0 (where the curve is “cut o¤” by setting
f (t; z) = ¡1 for z < 0): see (5.20).
Proof of Example 5.13. Take any t 2 T , ² > 0, p 2 L1 (T ) and y that maximises hp; ¢i
on S, i.e., z := ¡y minimises hp; ¢i on ¡S = fx : F (x) ¸ 'g. There exists a scalar
¹ ¸ 0 such that
p (¿ ) = ¹
@f
@z
(¿ ; z (¿ )) for ¾-almost every ¿ 2 T with z (¿ ) > 0(5.19)
p (¿ ) ¸ ¹@f
@z
(¿ ; z (¿)) for ¾-almost every ¿ 2 T with z (¿) = 0:(5.20)
If ¹ > 0 then, by Corollary B.2 applied to M = ¹@f=@z, there exists an H 2 N (t)
such that: for every t0 and t00 in H and every z0 and z00 in [EssInf (z) ;EssSup (z)] ½ R+
z0 < z00 ) @f
@z
(t0; z0) ¸ @f
@z
(t0; z00) ¸ @f
@z
(t00; z00)¡ ²
¹
:
23That the right (one-sided) derivative (@f=@z) (t; 0) is …nite is assumed only for simplicity. For
the purpose of proving price continuity, a nondecreasing f (t; ¢) with (@f=@z) (t; 0) = +1 can be
handled in the same way as @u=@x in Section 8; the in…nite marginal productivity (at 0) only helps
the argument (because it means that, like consumer demand, input demand responds to a price
jump with a nonzero drop).
18
From this and (5.19)–(5.20), for a.e. t0 and t00 in H,
z (t0) < z (t00)) p (t0) ¸ ¹@f
@z
(t0; z (t0)) ¸ ¹@f
@z
(t00; z (t00))¡ ² = p (t00)¡ ²:
In other words, for a.e. t0 and t00 in H,
²+ p (t0) < p (t00)) z (t0) ¸ z (t00)
which proves (5.12), since y = ¡z.
Finally, if ¹ = 0 then p (t00) > p (t0) implies that z (t00) = 0 · z (t0), as required.
There is an even weaker condition on the technologies which, together with sub-
symmetry of preferences, ensures price continuity in equilibrium. It holds for energy
storage (Lemma 9.1). To formulate it, we use the concept of the essential value of p
at t, discussed in Appendix A. Denoted by ess p (t), it exists if and only if the lower
and upper (essential) values are equal and …nite. In other words, t =2 domess p if and
only if either ¡1 < p (t) < p (t) < +1 or p (t) = ¡1 or p (t) = +1.
De…nition 5.14. A set S ½ L1 (T; ¾) is quasi-symmetric if:
For every p 2 L1 (T ) and every y that maximises hp; ¢i on S, and for any tz 2
T n domess p, there is a number ® > 0 such that every neighbourhood N 2 N (tz) has
a pair of ¾-nonnull subsets, A0 ½ N and A00 ½ N , such that
®+ ess sup
A0
p · ess inf
A00
p(5.21)
ess sup
A0
y · ess inf
A00
y:(5.22)
i.e., for ¾-almost every t0 2 A0 and t00 2 A00,24
®+ p (t0) · p (t00)(5.23)
y (t0) · y (t00) :(5.24)
Comments:
1. Again, with a quasi-symmetric S the relationship between p and y is not sym-
metric: p and y cannot be interchanged in (5.21)–(5.22) or (5.23)–(5.24).
2. The strict inequality between the values of p in (5.21) or (5.23) can be made
nonstrict without changing the concept. But the inequality between the values
of y in (5.22) or (5.24) must be non-strict, as in (5.2) or (5.3).
The “price part” of the quasi-symmetry condition is always met because it follows
purely from the hypothesis of a price discontinuity (i.e., from nonexistence of ess p at
tz).
24This means “for every t0 in A0 and t00 in A00 but outside of some ¾-null set Z ”. The excepted
set Z depends on the choice of variants of p and y, but it can be chosen independently of N because
the topology of T has a countable local base at each t 2 T .
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Remark 5.15. For any tz 2 T n domess p, there is an ® > 0 such that every N 2
N (tz) has ¾-nonnull subsets, A0 and A00, with ® + ess supA0 p · ess infA00 p. More
speci…cally:
1. If p (tz) = ¡1 or p (tz) = +1, then every ® > 0 has this property.
2. If ¡1 < p (tz) < p (tz) < +1, then any (positive) ® < p (tz)¡ p (tz) will do.
Proof. For every N 2 N (tz)
ess inf
N
p · p (tz) and p (tz) · ess sup
N
p:
Case 1: If p (tz) = +1 then ess supN p = +1; so for every ® there is an A00 ½ N
with p ¸ ess infN p+ 1 + ® almost everywhere (a.e.) on A00. There is also an A0 ½ N
with p · ess infN p+ 1 a.e. on A0; and hence (5.21).
When p (tz) = ¡1, the argument is similar.
Case 2: If ¡1 < p (tz) < p (tz) < +1, then ess infN0 p and ess supN0 p are …nite
for some N0 2 N (tz). For every N 2 N (tz) and ² > 0 there exist A0, A00 ½ N \N0
such that
p · ess inf
N\N0
p+
²
2
a:e: on A0 and p ¸ ess sup
N\N0
p¡ ²
2
a:e: on A00:
Used with an ² · p (tz)¡ p (tz)¡ ®, this gives
® · p (tz)¡ p (tz)¡ ² · ess sup
N\N0
p¡ ess inf
N\N0
p¡ ² · ess inf
A00
p¡ ess sup
A0
p
as required.
Corollary 5.16. Every sub-symmetric set (and hence every symmetric set) is quasi-
symmetric.
Proof. Given a sub-symmetric S ½ L1 (T ) and any p, tz and y as in De…nition 5.14,
…x any ® > 0 that is less than p (tz) ¡ p (tz) if p (tz) and p (tz) are …nite. Fix any
² < ®, and choose an H 2 N (tz) as in De…nition 5.11. For every N 2 N (tz), apply
Remark 5.15 (to N \H) to choose nonnull subsets, A0 and A00, of N \H with
²+ ess sup
A0
p < ® + ess sup
A0
p · ess inf
A00
p:
Since A0 [ A00 ½ H, it follows that ess supA0 y · ess infA00 y, by (5.11).
The condition formulated next is used in Section 8 to ensure, in the process of
proving price continuity, that the price is bounded and that consumption is therefore
bounded away from zero.
De…nition 5.17. A set S ½ L1 (T ) is pseudo-symmetric if, for every p 2 L1 (T )
and every y that maximises hp; ¢i on S,
lim
p%+1
ess inf
t: p(t)>p
y (t) ¸ EssSup (y) := ess sup
t2T
y (t)
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i.e., for every ± > 0 there is a p 2 R such that, for ¾-almost every t 2 T ,25
p (t) > p) y (t) ¸ EssSup (y)¡ ±:(5.25)
Comment: The condition is of interest only when p is unbounded. For a p 2 L1,
it is met vacuously by p = EssSup (p) or larger (since this means that p (t) · p for
a.e. t).
Lemma 5.18. Every symmetric set is pseudo-symmetric.
Proof. Given a symmetric S ½ L1 (T ) and any p and y maximising hp; ¢i on S, …x
any ± > 0 and denote the set of ±-near-peaks of y by
P± (y) := ft 2 T : y (t) ¸ EssSup (y)¡ ±g :
Take any two numbers p00 and p0 with
p00 > p0 > essinf
P±(y)
p
and de…ne the sets
A0 := ft 2 P± : p (t) · p0g and A00 := ft 2 T : p (t) ¸ p00g :
Then
ess inf
A00
p ¸ p00 > p0 ¸ ess sup
A0
p
which implies (by Lemma 5.9 and De…nition 5.3) that
ess inf
A00
y ¸ ess sup
A0
y ¸ ess inf
A0
y ¸ EssSup (y)¡ ±
(with the penultimate inequality holding because A0 is nonnull.) This means that
(5.25) holds for p = p00 (or larger).
An industrial user of a di¤erentiated good meets this condition if his production
function is additively separable.26
Example 5.19. With the assumptions of Example 5.13 on the concave integral func-
tional F (z) :=
R
T
f (t; z (t))¾ (dt) for z 2 L1+ , if additionally supt2T (@f=@z) (t; 0) <
+1 (as is the case when T is compact and @f=@z is continuous in t), then the
set S = fy · 0 : F (¡y) ¸ 'g is pseudo-symmetric for any ' 2 R (provided that
F (z) > ' for some z).
Proof. As in the Proof of Example 5.13, take a z := ¡y minimises hp; ¢i on ¡S =
fz : F (z) ¸ 'g and a ¹ 2 R+ satisfying (5.19)–(5.20). Set p := ¹ supt2T (@f=@z) (t; 0).
Then p ¸ ¹ (@f=@z) (t; z) for every t 2 T and z 2 R+, and so
p (t) > p) z (t) = 0 · EssInf (z)
25The excepted null subset of T can be chosen independently of ±.
26Similarly, a supplier of the good meets the condition if his cost is additively separable as in
Example 5.12.
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which means that (5.25) holds even for ± = 0. (To prove this only for ± > 0, which is
all that is required, it would su¢ce to assume supt2T (@f=@z) (t; 0) < +1 for every
z > 0.)
The symmetry, sub-symmetry, quasi-symmetry and pseudo-symmetry concepts are
applied to the sections of a production set Y ½L1 (T ) £ RG through a q 2 RG. To
say that such a set has symmetric (or sub-symmetric, etc.) T -sections means that
for every q 2 RG the set Y (q) de…ned by (5.1) is symmetric (or sub-symmetric, etc.).
These properties are mostly preserved in the summation of sets. To verify this, note
…rst that
Y = Y0 + Y00 ) Y (q) =
[
(q0;q00): q0+q00=q
(Y0 (q0) + Y00 (q00)) :(5.26)
Furthermore, the components of a pro…t-maximising y 2 Y (q) are also pro…t maxima;
i.e., if
y = y0 + y00 maximises hp; ¢i on Y (q)(5.27)
q = q0 + q00 and (y0; q0) 2 Y0 and (y00; q00) 2 Y00(5.28)
then
y0 maximises hp; ¢i on Y0 (q0) and y00 maximises hp; ¢i on Y00 (q00) :(5.29)
Lemma 5.20. If two subsets, Y0 and Y00, of L1 (T ) £ RG have symmetric sections
which are also convex and w (L1; L1)-closed (weakly* closed) in L1 (T ), then Y :=
Y0 + Y00 has symmetric sections.
Proof. This uses parts of the Hardy-Littlewood-Pólya Theorem, which characterises
the majorisation order ÁHLP, abbreviated to Á (de…ned below).
Take any q 2 RG, y 2 Y (q) and any z 2 L0 with the same distribution as y, i.e.,
¾±z¡1 = ¾±y¡1 (so z 2 L1). Since y and z have the same distribution (w.r.t. ¾), there
is a ¾-doubly stochastic (d.s.) operator27 D, on L1, with z = Dy: see [24, Theorem
1].28 Use (5.26) to choose (y0; q0) 2 Y0 and (y00; q00) 2 Y00 with y = y0+y00 and q = q0+q00.
Since D is d.s., Dy0 Á y0 2 Y0 (q0): see, e.g., [4, 4.9] or [24, Theorem 3]. It follows that
Dy0 2 Y0 (q0). (This step uses a characterisation of symmetry in terms of Á, which
27A ¾-d.s. operator is also known as a Markov operator with ¾ as an invariant measure.
28Denote by D (½)¤ the adjoint of D (½)x := x ± ½, the d.s. operator associated with a measure-
preserving map ½: T ! [0; ¾ (T )]. (If ½ is invertible, then D (½)¤ = D (½)¡1 = D ¡½¡1¢, but ½
may be noninvertible.) In these terms, a d.s. D that maps y to z can be found as the composition
D = D (½00)D (½0)¤, for any ½00 2 R (z) and ½0 2 R (y). This is because these inclusions mean that
z = D (½00) z# and y = D (½0) y#, which implies that y# = D (½0)
¤
y by [24, Lemma 3]; so, since
z# = y#, it follows that z = D (½00)D (½0)
¤ y. (The argument simpli…es, of course, if ½0 is invertible:
then y# = y ± ½0¡1, so z = y ± ½0¡1 ± ½00, and D = D
¡
½00 ± ½0¡1¢ will do.)
Also, although both D (½00) and D (½0)¤ are extreme points of the convex set D of all d.s. operators
[26, pp. 201–202], D (½00)D (½0)¤ need not be extreme unless ½00 or ½0 is invertible: see [26, Theorems
2 and 6]. However, the set Dy;z := fD 2 D : z = Dyg does contain an extreme point of D: see [26,
Theorem 1].
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is the partial nonstrict preorder (a re‡exive and transitive binary relation) de…ned
on L1 (T ) by: w Á x if and only if R ¿
0
w# (t) dt ·
R ¿
0
x# (t) dt for every ¿ 2 [0; ¾ (T )],
with equality when ¿ = ¾ (T ).29 For x# see De…nition 5.5. Denote the set of all
functions on T majorised by x by maj (x) := fw : w Á xg, and denote the set of those
equidistributed (a.k.a. equimeasurable) to x by eqd (x) := fw : ¾ ± w¡1 = ¾ ± x¡1g.
If x 2 L1 (T ) and ¾ is nonatomic, then maj (x) is convex and w (L1; L1)-compact,
and it is the w (L1; L1)-closed convex hull of eqd (x): see, e.g., [4, 5.2].30 So a closed
convex S is symmetric if and only if the conditions w Á x 2 S imply w 2 S.)
As has been shown, Dy0 2 Y0 (q0). SimilarlyDy00 2 Y00 (q00). Hence z = Dy0+Dy00 2
Y (q).
Comment: The relevant implication of symmetry is the similarity of arrangement
for p and y 2 argmaxY(q) hp; ¢i, by Lemma 5.9. Preservation of this property (in
summation) is even simpler to prove than preservation of symmetry: if y maximises
hp; ¢i on Y (q), use (5.26) to decompose it as in (5.27)–(5.28). Then, by (5.29) and
the assumed property of Y0 (q0) and Y00 (q00), both y0 and y00 are arranged similarly to
p; and it follows that so is y = y0 + y00 (Remark 5.8). A similar argument, spelt out
next, applies to the weaker conditions.
Lemma 5.21. For any two subsets, Y0 and Y00, of L0 (T )£ RG:
1. If both Y0 and Y00 have sub-symmetric T -sections, then so has Y := Y0 + Y00.
2. If Y0 has quasi-symmetric sections, and Y00 has sub-symmetric sections, then
Y := Y0 + Y00 has quasi-symmetric sections.
3. If both Y0 and Y00 have pseudo-symmetric sections, then so has Y := Y0 + Y00.
Proof. For all three parts of the lemma, given any q 2 RG, any p 2 L1 (T ) and y that
maximises hp; ¢i on Y (q), use (5.26) to choose (y0; q0) 2 Y0 and (y00; q00) 2 Y00 with
y = y0 + y00 and q = q0 + q00, as in (5.27)–(5.28). This ensures (5.29). From here on
the proof depends on the part.
For Part 1, given also any t 2 T and ² > 0, use (5.29) and the sub-symmetry of
both Y0 (q0) and Y00 (q00) to take H 0 2 N (t) and H 00 2 N (t) as in De…nition 5.11
with y0 or y00 in place of y. Set H := H 0 \ H 00; then for ¾-a.e. t1 and t2 in H, if
²+ p (t1) < p (t2) then both y0 (t1) · y0 (t2) and y00 (t1) · y00 (t2), and so y (t1) · y (t2)
by adding up. This proves Part 1.
For Part 2, one extends the Proof of Corollary 5.16 by combining it with the
decomposition of y. Given also any tz 2 T n domess p, use (5.29) and the quasi-
symmetry of Y0 (q0) to take an ® > 0 as in De…nition 5.14 (with y0 in place of y). Fix
any positive ² < ®, and use (5.29) and the sub-symmetry of Y00 (q00), to choose an
H 2 N (tz) as in De…nition 5.11 (with y00 in place of y). For every N 2 N (tz), by the
29Roughly speaking, w Á x means that the distribution of w (w.r.t. ¾) is “more concentrated
about the average” than the distribution of x.
30A stronger result is that eqd (x) is the set of all the extreme points of maj (x): see [25, p. 1026].
A similar result holds for weak majorisation [8].
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quasi-symmetry of Y0 (q0), there exist nonnull subsets, A1 and A2, of N \H with
ess sup
A1
y0 · ess inf
A2
y0(5.30)
²+ ess sup
A1
p < ® + ess sup
A1
p · ess inf
A2
p:(5.31)
Since A1[A2 ½ H, it follows—from (5.31) and (5.11) applied to y00 2 Y00 (q00) in place
of y 2 S—that
ess sup
A1
y00 · ess inf
A2
y00:
Adding this to (5.30) and applying (5.9)–(5.10) completes the argument.
For Part 3, given also any ± > 0, use (5.29) and the pseudo-symmetry of both
Y0 (q0) and Y00 (q00) to take p00 and p0 such that, for a.e. t,
p (t) > p0 ) y0 (t) ¸ EssSup (y0)¡ ±
2
p (t) > p00 ) y00 (t) ¸ EssSup (y00)¡ ±
2
and set p = max fp0; p00g. Then, for a.e. t,
p (t) > p) y (t) = y0 (t) + y00 (t) ¸ EssSup (y0) + EssSup (y00)¡ ± ¸ EssSup (y)¡ ±
as required.
6. Sub-symmetry of preferences
A variant of the sub-symmetry concept is needed to formulate a condition on con-
sumer preferences which, together with quasi-symmetry of the production set, ensures
price continuity in equilibrium. For use in this context, the condition is reoriented
to minimisation of “expenditure” instead of maximisation of “pro…t” as in De…ni-
tion 5.11. (Also, it is formulated “pointwise” because its veri…cation requires a con-
dition on the x in question, e.g., that EssInf (x) > 0 in Example 6.2. This is needed
because the demand x (t) cannot drop when it is zero.) Recall that N (t) means the
set of all neighbourhoods of t.
De…nition 6.1. A set S ½ L1 (T ) is strongly sub-symmetric at a point x 2 S if:
For every p 2 L1 (T ) such that x minimises hp; ¢i on S, and for every t 2 T and
² > 0, there exist an H 2 N (t) and a ± > 0 such that for any two measurable sets
A0 ½ H and A00 ½ H
²+ ess sup
A0
p < ess inf
A00
p ) ess inf
A0
x ¸ ± + ess sup
A00
x:(6.1)
Equivalently, for any t and ² such as above, there exists an H 2 N (t) and a ± > 0
such that, for ¾-almost every t0 and t00 in H,
²+ p (t0) < p (t00)) x (t0) ¸ x (t00) + ±:(6.2)
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Comments:
1. If S is strongly sub-symmetric (at every x), then it is sub-symmetric.
2. A symmetric set need not be strongly sub-symmetric at every point. For exam-
ple, if c (t; y (t)) in (5.13) is c (y (t)), a convex function of y (t) alone, then the
sublevel set (5.14) is symmetric and hence sub-symmetric, but not strongly so,
unless c is di¤erentiable.
3. In (6.1) or (6.2), the inequalities can be made nonstrict or strict without changing
the concept (because of the ² and ±).
This concept is used with S equal to a superlevel set for the ordering of L1+ (T )
obtained by …xing an em 2 RG in an ordering 4 of L1+ (T )£RG+, i.e., with S equal to
S (ex; em;4) := ©x 2 L1+ (T ) : (ex; em) 4 (x; em)ª ;(6.3)
a “preferred set” for an em-section of 4. When 4 is de…ned by a function U on
L1+ (T )£ RG+, this set is fx : U (ex; em) · U (x; em)g, a superlevel set of U = U (¢; em).
An example of strong sub-symmetry in consumption is the additively separable
utility function U (x) =
R
T
u (t; x (t)) dt (for a …xedm). This is mathematically similar
to the case of additively separable cost and production functions (Examples 5.12 and
5.13).
Example 6.2. Assume that u: T £ R+ ! R is a di¤erentiable concave integrand,
i.e., the function t 7! u (t; x) is ¾-integrable on T (for every x 2 R+), whilst the
function x 7! u (t; x) is concave, (strictly) increasing and di¤erentiable on R++ (and
continuous also at x = 0), for every t 2 T . Then
U (x) :=
Z
T
u (t; x (t)) ¾ (dt)(6.4)
is a concave integral functional on L1+ (T ): see, e.g., [22].
If additionally @u=@x is (jointly) continuous on T £R++, then, for any ex 2 L1 (T )
with EssInf (ex) > 0, the set
S =
©
x 2 L1+ (T ) : U (x) ¸ U (ex)ª(6.5)
is strongly sub-symmetric at ex.
Proof. Take any t 2 T , ² > 0 and p 2 L1 (T ) such that x minimises hp; ¢i on S (so
p ¸ 0). If p = 0, there is nothing to prove. If p 6= 0, then (since EssInf (ex) > 0) there
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is a (unique) scalar e¸ > 0 such that, for a.e. t 2 T ,31
e¸p (t) = @u
@x
(t; ex (t)) :(6.6)
Since EssInf (ex) > 0, Corollary B.2 applies to M = @uh=@x with x := EssInf (ex)
and x := EssSup (ex); so for every t 2 T and ² > 0 there exist a number ± > 0 and
an H 2 N (t) such that: for each h, every t0 and t00 in H and every x0 and x00 in
[x; x] ½ R++
x0 < x00 + ± ) @u
@x
(t0; x0) >
@u
@x
(t00; x00)¡ e¸²:
From this and (6.6), for a.e. t0 and t00 in H,
ex (t0) < ex (t00) + ± ) p (t0) = 1e¸ @uh@x (t0; ex (t0)) > 1e¸ @u@x (t00; ex (t00))¡ ² = p (t00)¡ ²:
In other words, for a.e. t0 and t00 in H,
²+ p (t0) · p (t00)) ex (t0) ¸ ex (t00) + ±
which proves (6.2).
The strong sub-symmetry condition can be veri…ed for other functional forms of
utility. For example, the additively separable form can be generalised by adding
further terms.
Example 6.3. Assume that v: T £ R+ £ T £ R+ ! R has the properties:
1. The function (x; ») 7! u (t; x; ¿ ; ») is jointly concave, increasing and continuously
di¤erentiable on R2+ (for every (t; ¿) 2 T £ T ).
2. The function (t; ¿ ) 7! v (t; x; ¿ ; ») is ¾£¾-integrable on T £T (for every (x; ») 2
R2+).
With u: T £ R+ ! R as in Example 6.2 (and @u=@x continuous), de…ne
U (x) :=
Z
T
u (t; x (t)) ¾ (dt) +
Z
T
Z
T
v (t; x (t) ; ¿ ; x (¿)) ¾ (dt)¾ (d¿ )(6.7)
for x 2 L1+ (T ). Assume also, without loss of generality, that v (t; x; ¿ ; ») = v (¿ ; »; t; x).
If additionally @2v=@x@» · 0 everywhere and EssInf (ex) > 0, then the set
S =
©
x 2 L1+ (T ) : U (x) ¸ U (ex)ª
31To prove (6.6), use the formula for the normal cone to a superlevel set of a continuous concave
function: see, e.g., [17, 4.3: Proposition 2] or [28, 7.8]. (Slater’s Condition holds here because
u is increasing in x; and U is norm-continuous at ex because EssInf (ex) > 0.) This shows that
p 2 ¸¡1@U (ex) for some ¸ > 0; and the formula for @U—given in [22, Corollary 2C] and [17, 8.3:
Theorem 3]—completes the argument. (Here @U reduces to rU .) It also follows that pÀ 0.
Given Remark 8.2, the FOC for an expenditure minimum can also be deduced from the FOC for
a utility maximum, i.e., from Lemma 8.1 with G = 0. (This applies here because hp; exi > 0.)
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is strongly sub-symmetric at ex.32
7. Continuity of the equilibrium price density function
As is shown next, the weak “symmetry-like” conditions are su¢cient for price
continuity in equilibrium. The sets of producers and households (or consumers) are
denoted by Pr and Ho. The production set of producer i 2 Pr is Yi ½ L1 (T )£ RG,
and Y :=
P
i2PrYi is the total production set. The consumption set of each household
h 2 Ho is the nonnegative orthant L1+ (T )£ RG+. Consumer preferences, taken to be
complete and transitive, are given by a total (a.k.a. complete) weak preorder 4h. The
corresponding strict preference is denoted by Áh. The household’s initial endowment
is denoted by
¡
xEnh ;m
En
h
¢ 2 L1+ £ RG+; and the household’s share in the pro…ts of
producer i is &hi ¸ 0, with
P
h &hi = 1 for each i. (The ranges of running indices
in summations, etc., are always taken to be the largest possible with any speci…ed
restrictions.)
De…nition 7.1. A price system (p?; r?) 2 L1£RG supports an allocation, (x?h;m?h) ¸
0 and (y?i ; q
?
i ) 2 Yi for each h 2 Ho and i 2 Pr, as a competitive equilibrium if:
1.
P
h
¡
x?h ¡ xEnh ;m?h ¡mEnh
¢
= (y?; q?) :=
P
i (y
?
i ; q
?
i ).
2. hp?; y?i i+ hr?; q?i i = supy;q fhp?; yi+ hr?; qi : (y; q) 2 Yig.
3. hp?; x?hi+ hr?;m?hi =
­
p?; xEnh +
P
i &hiy
?
i
®
+
­
r?;mEnh +
P
i &hiq
?
i
®
.
4. For every (x;m) ¸ 0, if hp?; xi + hr?;mi · hp?; x?hi + hr?;m?hi, then (x;m) 4h
(x?h;m
?
h).
Theorem 7.2. Assume that:
1. A price system (p?; r?) 2 L1 (T; ¾)£RG supports a competitive equilibrium with
a consumption allocation (x?h;m
?
h) 2 L1+ (T )£RG+ (for h 2 Ho) and with a total
input-output bundle (y?; q?) 2 Y.
2. The section Y (q?) of the total production set is a quasi-symmetric subset of
L1 (T ).
3. The set S (x?h;m
?
h;4h), de…ned by (6.3), is strongly sub-symmetric at x?h, for
each household h.
4. xEnh 2 C+ (T ) for each h (i.e., the initial endowment is nonnegative and has a
continuous variant).
Then the equilibrium price has a continuous variant, viz., ess p? 2 C (T ).
Proof. Recall that T has a countable base of open sets which are ¾-nonnull. So,
by Corollary A.3, it su¢ces to show that ess p? exists everywhere on T . Suppose
contrarily that there is a t 2 T n domess p?. Since y? maximises hp?; ¢i on Y (q?), use
the quasi-symmetry of Y (q?) to choose a number ® > 0 as in De…nition 5.14. Fix also
32A weaker su¢cient condition on the derivatives is that @2v=@x@» < @2u=@x2.
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any positive ² · ®.33 Since x?h minimises hp?; ¢i on S (x?h;m?h;4h),34 use the strong
sub-symmetry of this set to choose a number ± > 0 and an H 2 N (t) such that, for
each h and for ¾-almost every t0 and t00 in H
²+ p? (t0) < p? (t00)) x?h (t0) ¸ x?h (t00) + ±:(7.1)
Fix any positive number ¯ · ±. By the continuity of xEnh , there is an I 2 N (t) such
that for a.e. t0 and t00 in I, and for each h,¯¯
xEnh (t
0)¡ xEnh (t00)
¯¯
< ¯ · ±:(7.2)
By the quasi-symmetry of Y (q?)—i.e., by (5.21)–(5.22) applied to N = H \ I—there
exist ¾-nonnull sets A0 ½ H \ I and A00 ½ H \ I with
ess sup
A0
y? · ess inf
A00
y?(7.3)
®+ ess sup
A0
p? · ess inf
A00
p?:(7.4)
From this and (7.1) it follows that, for each h,
x?h (t
0) ¸ x?h (t00) + ± for a:e: t0 2 A0 and t00 2 A00(7.5)
(i.e., for every t0 2 A0 n Z and every t00 2 A00 n Z, where Z is some ¾-null set). Since
y? =
P
h
¡
x?h ¡ xEnh
¢
, it follows from (7.2) and (7.5) that y? (t0) > y? (t00) for a.e. t0 2 A0
and t00 2 A00; and a fortiori (since ¾ (A0) > 0 and ¾ (A00) > 0)
ess sup
A0
y? > ess inf
A00
y?:
This contradicts (7.3) and thus proves that domess p? = T .
8. Continuity and boundedness of price and quantity with additively
separable utility
The strong sub-symmetry condition on preferences in Theorem 7.2 is met when
consumer utility is a di¤erentiable additively separable function on L1+ (T )—or, more
precisely, when the utility from x is a monotone function of an integral functional of x
(for a …xedm). Veri…cation of sub-symmetry rests on Example 6.2 and the …rst-order
condition, given next, for utility maximisation or expenditure minimisation.
Lemma 8.1. Assume that u: T £R+£RG+ ! R is a di¤erentiable concave integrand
parameterised by RG+, i.e.:
1. For every t 2 T , the function (x;m) 7! u (t; x;m) is concave;
and for every m 2 RG+:
2. The function t 7! u (t; x;m) is ¾-integrable on T (for every x 2 R+).
33The value ² = ® will do, but a smaller ² dispels any impression that the argument “hangs by
a thread”, in the sense of relying on the contradiction between a strict inequality a < b and the
reverse inequality a ¸ b. The same goes for the choice of a ¯ · ±.
34With 4h locally nonsatiated, utility maximisation implies expenditure minimisation: see Re-
mark 8.2.
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3. The function x 7! u (t; x;m) is concave, (strictly) increasing and continuous on
R+, for every t 2 T .
Assume also that W : R1+G ! R is di¤erentiable, concave, and increasing (in each
variable); and de…ne
U (x;m) := W (U (x;m) ;m)(8.1)
where, for x 2 L1+ (T ) and m 2 RG+,
U (x;m) :=
Z
T
u (t; x (t) ;m) ¾ (dt)(8.2)
(with u (t; x;m) := ¡1 for x < 0 and U (x;m) := ¡1 for (x;m) ® 0). If additionally
p 2 L1 (T ), M > 0, and (ex; em) maximises U (x;m) over x and m subject to: hp; xi+
r ¢m ·M , x ¸ 0 and m ¸ 0, then there exists a scalar e¸ > 0 such thate¸p (t) 2 @xu (t; ex (t) ; em) for ¾-almost every t 2 T:(8.3)
When (@u=@x) (0) = +1, it follows that ex À 0 (i.e., ex (t) > 0 for a.e. t 2 T ). If
additionally u is di¤erentiable w.r.t. x on R++, then there is a unique scalar e¸ > 0
such that, for a.e. t 2 T , e¸p (t) = @u
@x
(t; ex (t) ; em) :(8.4)
Proof. One way to derive (8.4) is to use the …rst-order condition of smooth opti-
misation, after extending u (t; ¢;m) to a di¤erentiable function on the whole of R.
A more general method, which applies also when u is nondi¤erentiable in x, is the
Kuhn-Tucker Condition of convex optimisation. (This does not require a concave
extension of u (t; ¢;m) beyond R+, so it applies also when @u=@x% +1 as x& 0, as
is assumed from (8.13) on.) For an (ex; em) ¸ 0 to be a maximum point it is necessary
(and su¢cient) that there exists a (¸; ¹; º) 2 R++ £ L1¤+ £ RG+ such that, with @
denoting the subdi¤erential,35
(¸p¡ ¹; ¸r ¡ º) 2 @x;mU (ex; em)(8.5)
hp; exi+ r ¢ em =M(8.6)
¹ is concentrated on ft 2 T : ex (t) · ²g for every ² > 0:(8.7)
º ¢ em = 0:(8.8)
(See, e.g., [23, Examples 4’, 4”],36 where [23, (8.12)] implies, through [23, Theorems 18
(a) and 17 (a)], “the strong form of the Kuhn-Tucker Theorem”, i.e., the equivalence in
[23, Corollary 15A], so that every primal optimum is “supported” by a dual optimum.
And, withM > 0, the Generalised Slater’s Condition of [23, (8.12)] is veri…ed at, e.g.,
the point (x;m) = (²1T ; ²; : : : ; ²): for su¢ciently small ² > 0, it meets the budget
35Since U is concave and W is concave and increasing, their composition U is also concave.
36The “cone model” of inequality constraints [23, Examples 4’, 4”] is also expounded in, e.g., [2,
4.2].
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constraint strictly, and it lies in the interior of L1+ (T )£RG+ for the supremum norm.
Finally, it is impossible for ¸ to be 0 because of nonsatiation, i.e., because u is
increasing in x, and W is increasing in U .) Obviously (8.5) implies that
¸p¡ ¹ 2 @xU (ex; em) = @W
@U
@xU (ex; em) :(8.9)
From this and the formula for @xU given in, e.g., [22, Corollary 2C] and [17, 8.3:
Theorem 3] it follows that (with em suppressed from the notation)
(¸p¡ ¹)CA (t) = ¸p¡ ¹CA (t) 2 °@xu (t; ex (t)) for a:e: t 2 T(8.10)
where ° := @W=@U > 0, and ¹CA is the countably additive part of ¹ 2 L1¤ (in the
Hewitt-Yosida decomposition, for which see, e.g., [1, Appendix I: (26)–(27)] or [6,
III.7.8]). Since the term ¹CA (t) is nonnegative and actually vanishes unless ex (t) = 0,
it can be absorbed into @xu (t; 0) = [(@u=@x) (t; 0) ;+1); and thus (8.10) can be
restated as (8.3) with e¸ := ¸=°. When @u=@x = +1 at x = 0, it follows that exÀ 0
because @xu = ; at x = 0. When u is additionally di¤erentiable w.r.t. x on R++, (8.3)
simpli…es to (8.4), since @xu (t; ex (t)) = f(@u=@x) (t; ex (t))g.
Comments:
1. Formulae (8.3) and (8.4) can also be derived directly by subdi¤erentiation of
U (x;m) ¡ ± ((x;m) j H), where ± (¢ j H) is the 0-1 indicator function of the
half-space
H (p; r;M) =
©
(x;m) 2 L1 £ RG : hp; xi+ r ¢m ·Mª :
(The constraint (x;m) ¸ 0 is included in the de…nition of U.) A point (ex; em)
yields the maximum in question if and only if
0 2 @x;m (U (x;m) + ± ((x;m) j H (p; r;M)))
¯¯¯
x=ex
m=em
and this condition can be expanded, as in [23, p. 57] or [28, 7.2 and 7.9], by
using the additivity of @ (for which see, e.g., [23, Theorem 20] or [28, 5.38 and
7.2]). As before, the calculation is completed by the formula for @xU (in [22,
Corollary 2C] and [17, 8.3: Theorem 3]).
2. That p 2 L1 is part of (8.4), but that part is assumed and not proved in
Lemma 8.1: unless EssInf (ex) > 0, ex can be optimal also when p 2 L1¤ n L1.
Utility maximisation is usually equivalent to expenditure minimisation.
Remark 8.2. Assume that 4 is a total preorder on a closed convex subset X of
a real topological vector space (L; T ), and that 4 is T -locally nonsatiated and lower
semicontinuous along each linear segment of X.37 Then the following three conditions
37By de…nition, 4 is T -locally nonsatiated if x0 2 clT fx 2 X : x0 Á xg for every x0 2 X (where
x0 Á x means that x0 4 x and x0 6< x). Even for the strongest choice of T this follows from
nonsatiation if 4 can be represented by a concave function U . Also, the line-wise l.s. continuity
follows from l.s. continuity for any vector topology on L.
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on a point ex 2 X and a continuous linear functional p 2 (L; T )¤ are equivalent to
one another, provided that there exists an x0 2 X with hp; x0i < hp; exi:
1. For every x 2 X, if hp; xi · hp; exi then x 4 ex.
2. For every x 2 X, if hp; xi < hp; exi then x 4 ex.
3. For every x 2 X, if hp; xi < hp; exi then x Á ex (i.e., if x < ex, then hp; xi ¸
hp; exi).
Proof. Either of Conditions 1 and 3 obviously implies Condition 2. To show that
Condition 2 implies Condition 3, take any x0 < ex. Then by local nonsatiation (and
by Condition 2)
hp; x0i ¸ inf
x
fhp; xi : x Â x0g ¸ hp; exi :
Finally, to show that Condition 2 implies Condition 1, take any x 2 X with hp; xi ·
hp; exi, and introduce x® := (1¡ ®)x0 + ®x for ® 2 [0; 1). Then hp; x®i < hp; exi, so
x® 4 ex (by Condition 2). As ®% 1, it follows that x 4 ex.
Condition (8.4) is next used to establish two preliminary results on equilibrium,
viz., that the price p? is bounded and that the consumption x?h is therefore bounded
away from zero. For this, the utility of each household h, is henceforth taken to have
the form (8.1)–(8.2). The “instantaneous” utility a.k.a. felicity, uh, is assumed to
meet the following conditions, in addition to those of Lemma 8.1.
Continuity of Marginal Utility. For every h and m 2 RG+
@uh
@x
(¢; ¢;m) 2 C (T £R++)(8.11)
i.e., the function (t; x) 7! (@uh=@x) (t; x;m) is (jointly) continuous on T £ R++.38
Boundedness of Marginal Utility (in t). For every h and (x;m) 2 R++ £ RG+
sup
t2T
@uh
@x
(t; x;m) < +1:(8.12)
When T is compact, this follows from the continuity of @uh=@x in t.
Unboundedness of Marginal Utility (in x). For every h and m 2 RG+
@uh
@x
(t; x;m)% +1 uniformly in t 2 T as x& 0:(8.13)
Remark 8.3. Assume (8.13). If xEnh = 0 for each h, then y
? À 0.
Proof. By Lemma 8.1, 0¿Ph x?h = y?.
Proposition 8.4. In addition to (8.12) and (8.13), assume that:
1. The section Y (q?) of the total production set is a pseudo-symmetric subset of
L1 (T ).
2. xEnh ¸ 0 for each h.
38Partial continuity of @uh=@x in x follows from its monotonicity, i.e., from the concavity (and
di¤erentiability) of uh in x.
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3. hp?; x?hi+ r ¢m?h > 0 for each h, i.e., the equilibrium expenditures are positive.
4. EssSup (y?) > 0, i.e., the equilibrium net output of the di¤erentiated good is
nonzero (as is the case by Remark 8.3 if xEnh = 0 for each h).
Then p? 2 L1 (T ), i.e., the equilibrium price is essentially bounded.
Proof. The idea is that a su¢ciently high price would depress the demand so much
that it could not equal the supply, given that the output is then close to its peak by
pseudo-symmetry.
Since p? ¸ 0, it su¢ces to show that p? is bounded from above. By (8.4),39 for each
h there exists a ¸¤h > 0 such that, for a.e. t 2 T ,
¸¤hp (t) =
@uh
@x
(t; x¤h (t) ;m
¤
h) :(8.14)
Fix any positive numbers y and (xh) withX
h2Ho
xh < y < EssSup (y
?)
and use (8.12) to de…ne
p0 := max
h2Ho
sup
t2T
1
¸¤h
@uh
@x
(t; xh) < +1
with m?h suppressed from the notation henceforth. By (8.14),
x?h (t) ¸ xh ) p? (t) =
1
¸¤h
@uh
@x
(t; x?h (t)) ·
1
¸¤h
@uh
@x
(t; xh) · p0:
Since xEnh ¸ 0, it follows that for a.e. t
p? (t) > p0 ) y? (t) ·
X
h
x?h (t) <
X
h2Ho
xh < y < EssSup (y
?) :(8.15)
Since y < EssSup (y?) and Y (q?) is pseudo-symmetric, there exists a p00 2 R such
that, for a.e. t,
p (t) > p00 ) y (t) ¸ y:(8.16)
Set p = max fp0; p00g. Then
p? (t) · p for almost every t 2 T(8.17)
because (8.15) and (8.16) contradict each other unless ft : p? (t) > pg is a null set.
Comments: When Y (q?) is symmetric, the Proof of Proposition 8.4 simpli…es and
strengthens:
39Lemma 8.1 applies because incomes (equal to expenditures) are positive.
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1. The number p0 itself is a bound on p?. This is because, in terms of the sets
A0 := ft 2 T : p? (t) > p0g and A00 := ft 2 T : y? (t) ¸ yg
the implication (8.15) means that
ess sup
A0
y? < y · ess inf
A00
y?
and, since y? and p? are similarly arranged (Lemma 5.9), it follows that
ess sup
A0
p? · ess inf
A00
p? · ess sup
A00
p? · p0:
(The penultimate inequality holds because A00 is ¾-nonnull, whilst the last in-
equality holds by (8.15) again.) This shows that
ess sup
t: p?(t)>p0
p? (t) · p0
which cannot be—unless p? · p0 a.e. (in which case A0 is a null set and the
supremum on A0 is ¡1).
2. In the one-consumer case with xEn = 0, the number p0 (which depends on x)
becomes the exact upper bound on p? as x % EssSup (y?), since ¸?p0 decreases
to
inf
x: x<Sup(y?)
sup
t2T
@u
@x
(t; x) = sup
t2T
inf
x: x<Sup(y?)
@u
@x
(t; x) = sup
t2T
@u
@x
(t;EssSup (y?))
= ¸? EssSup (p?) :
Remark 8.3 can now be strengthened so that Example 6.2 can be applied to verify
the sub-symmetry condition of Theorem 7.2.
Corollary 8.5. On the assumptions of Proposition 8.4, EssInf (x?h) > 0 for each h.
Proof. The idea is that a bounded price must mean a positive minimum consumption
rate (since the marginal utility becomes in…nite at zero).
By Proposition 8.4 and the uniformity of divergence in (8.13), for each h there is a
constant xh > 0 with
@uh
@x
(t; xh) > ¸
?
h EssSup (p
?) for every t 2 T:
It follows that
x?h (t) > xh for a:e: t 2 T
since x?h (t) · xh implies that
@uh
@x
(t; x?h (t)) ¸
@uh
@x
(t; xh) > ¸
?
hp
? (t)
which contradicts (8.14).
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Corollary 8.6. In addition to the assumptions of Proposition 8.4, assume (8.11).
Then for each h the set S (x?h;m
?
h;4h), de…ned by (6.3), is strongly sub-symmetric at
x?h.
Proof. This follows from Corollary 8.5 and Example 6.2.
With @uh=@x in…nite at x = 0 as per (8.13), continuity of the equilibrium price
follows.
Corollary 8.7. In addition to (8.11), (8.12) and (8.13), assume (as in Theorem 7.2)
that:
1. A price system (p?; r?) 2 L1 (T )£ RG supports a competitive equilibrium with a
consumption allocation (x?h;m
?
h)h2Ho and a total input-output bundle (y
?; q?) 2 Y.
2. The section Y (q?) of the total production set is quasi-symmetric, and also pseudo-
symmetric.
3. xEnh 2 C+ (T ) for each h.
Assume also (as in Proposition 8.4) that:
4. hp?; x?hi+ r ¢m?h > 0 for each h.
5. 0 < EssSup (y?) := ess supT y
? (as is the case by Remark 8.3 when xEnh = 0 for
each h).
Then the equilibrium price has a continuous and bounded variant, viz., ess p? 2
CB (T ).40
Proof. This follows from Corollary 8.6 and Theorem 7.2.
When the equation ¸p = (@uh=@x) (t; x) has a unique solution for x, price continuity
implies that the equilibrium quantities, x?h (t) and y
? (t), are also continuous in t.
Corollary 8.8. On the assumptions of Corollary 8.7, if additionally T is compact
and (@uh=@x) (t; ¢) is (strictly) decreasing, for each t—i.e., the “instantaneous” utility
function x 7! uh (t; x) is strictly concave (as well as di¤erentiable on R++)—then
the equilibrium consumption of the di¤erentiated good has a continuous variant, viz.,
essx?h 2 C (T ).
Proof. As is shown below, x?h has a variant
x¸?h: T ! [xh; xh] = [EssInf (x?h) ;EssSup (x?h)] ½ R++
for which (8.14) holds everywhere on T , i.e.,
¸¤h ess p
? (t) =
@uh
@x
(t; x¸?h (t)) for every t 2 T:(8.18)
(To see this, start from any variant x¸?h: T ! [xh; xh], for which (8.18) holds for t
outside of some ¾-null set Z. For any t 2 Z choose a sequence tn 2 T nZ with tn ! t
as n! +1, then choose a limit point x of the sequence (x¸?h (tn)), and rede…ne x¸?h (t)
as x. Since (8.18) holds along the sequence tn, it also holds at t = limn tn because
@uh=@x and ess p? are continuous by (8.11) and Corollary 8.7.)
40Because of (8.12), p? is bounded even if T is not compact.
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Since uh (t; ¢) is strictly concave, (8.18) can be inverted to give x¸?h as the composition
x¸?h (t) =
µ
@uh
@x
(t; ¢)
¶¡1
(¸¤h ess p
? (t)) for every t 2 T:(8.19)
By (8.11), Lemma B.3 applies to M = @uh=@x with K = [xh; xh]; and it shows that
the function
(t; r) 7!
µ
@uh
@x
(t; ¢)
¶¡1
(r)
is continuous (in t and r jointly). Since ess p? is continuous on T by Corollary 8.7, it
follows from (8.19) that so is x¸?h (and also that x¸
?
h = essx
?
h).
9. Application to peak-load pricing with storage
The price continuity theorem is next applied to electricity pricing with (or without)
pumped storage. This extends the results of Sections 2 and 3 to the case of cross-price
dependent demand, provided that the preferences and technologies of electricity users
meet the weak “symmetry-like” conditions. To present this application rigorously yet
brie‡y, we assume that:
1. As a result of aggregating commodities on the basis of some …xed relative prices,
there are just two consumption goods apart from electricity—viz., a numeraire
(measured in $) and a homogeneous …nal good produced with an input of elec-
tricity.
2. The various kinds of thermal generating capacity and fuel have …xed prices, rTh =
(r1; : : : ; r£) and w = (w1; : : : ; w£), in terms of the numeraire (i.e., in $/kW
and in $/kWh, respectively). The prices of storage and conversion capacities,
rPS = (rSt; rCo), are also …xed (in $/kWh and in $/kW).
A complete commodity bundle consists therefore of electricity (a di¤erentiated
good) and of a number of homogeneous goods, viz., the thermal capacities, the fuels,
the storage and conversion capacities, the produced …nal good and the numeraire.
The quantities are always written in this order; but those which are irrelevant in a
particular context (and can be set equal to zero) may be omitted for brevity. For
example, a consumption bundle consists of electricity, the produced …nal good and
the numeraire; so it may be written as (x;';m) 2 L1 [0; T ] £ R2. A matching
consumer price system is (p; %; 1) 2 L1¤ [0; T ] £ R2 (whilst a complete price system
is (p; rTh;w; rPS; %; 1)). There is a …nite set, Ho, of households; and for each h 2 Ho
the utility function Uh is m(L1 £ R2; L1 £ R2)-continuous (i.e., Mackey continuous)
on the consumption set L1+ [0; T ] £ R2+. Each household’s initial endowment is a
quantity mEnh > 0 of the numeraire only; and nonsatiation in this commodity is
assumed. The preference order can of course be regarded as de…ned on the orthant in
the full commodity space L := L1 [0; T ]£R2£+4 by positing that the consumer has no
use for the electricity supplier’s inputs, which are kTh = (k1; : : : ; k£), v = (v1; : : : ; v£)
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and kPS = (kSt; kCo). This means regarding a utility Uh on L1+ £R2+ as a function on
L1+ £ R2£+2+2+ de…ned by (x; kTh; v; kPS;';m) 7! Uh (x;';m).
There is also an industrial user, producing the …nal good from inputs of electricity
and the numeraire. (In the case of decreasing returns to scale, each household’s
share &h in the user industry’s pro…ts must be speci…ed.) The user’s production
function F : L1+ [0; T ] £ R+ ! R is also assumed to be concave, nondecreasing and
m(L1 £ R; L1 £ R)-continuous, and to have a nonzero recession function; i.e., the
user’s production set YIU contains an activity with constant returns to scale, other
than free disposal. The section of YIU through any (';¡m) 2 R£R¡, which is
YIU (';¡m) =
©¡z 2 L1¡ [0; T ] : F (z;m) ¸ 'ª ;(9.1)
is assumed to be sub-symmetric.
The electricity supplier uses a multi-station thermal technology and pumped stor-
age. Each thermal technique µ generates an output ‡ow yµ from the inputs of fuel
vµ (in kWh), and of generating capacity kµ (measured in kW, like the output rate
yµ (t)). The LR production set of technique µ = 1; : : : ; £ is the cone
Yµ :=
½
(yµ;¡kµ;¡vµ) 2 L1 [0; T ]£R2¡ : EssSup
¡
y+µ
¢ · kµ; Z T
0
y+µ dt · vµ
¾
(9.2)
and the total thermal production set is
YTh :=
(Ã
£X
µ=1
yµ;¡ (kµ; vµ)µ2£
!
: (yµ;¡kµ;¡vµ) 2 Yµ for µ = 1; : : : ;£
)
:
This is the sum of the Yµ’s, each of which is embedded in L1£
¡
R2¡
¢£
; di¤erent types
of station are assumed to use di¤erent fuels, for simplicity. The set YTh is further
embedded in L =
¡
L1 £ R2£¢£R4 as YTh£f(0; : : : ; 0)g. The other production sets
are also embedded in L by inserting zeros at the appropriate positions.
To justify formally the …xed prices of inputs for electricity supply (rTh, w and rPS),
there is the production set with the locus equation r ¢ k + w ¢ v + m = 0 in the
(k; v;m)-space.
Thermal generation is supplemented by pumped storage. In this technique, the
signed out‡ow of energy from the reservoir, ¡ _s (t) = ¡ds=dt, is a bounded function
of time t 2 [0; T ]. Energy is moved in and out of storage with a converter, which
is taken to be perfectly e¢cient and symmetrically reversible: this means that in a
unit time a unit converter can either turn a unit of the marketed good (electricity)
into a unit of the stocked intermediate good (a storable form of energy), or vice
versa. On this simplifying assumption, ¡ _s (t) equals the rate of net ‡ow from storage,
yPS (t) =
¡
y+PS ¡ y¡PS
¢
(t). The converter’s capacity is denoted by kCo (measured in
kW). The reservoir’s capacity is kSt (in kWh); stock can be held in storage at no
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running cost (or loss of stock). The LR production set is, therefore,
YPS :=
©
(y;¡kSt;¡kCo) 2 L1 [0; T ]£R2¡ : jyj · kCo;
and 9s _s = ¡y; s (0) = s (T ) ; and 0 · s · kStg :
The minimum requirements for storage capacity and conversion capacity, when the
(signed) output from storage is yPS with
·kSt (yPS) = max
t2[0;T ]
Z t
0
yPS (t) dt+ max
t2[0;T ]
Z T
t
yPS (t) dt(9.3)
·kCo (yPS) = kyPSk1 = ess sup
t2[0;T ]
jyPS (t)j :(9.4)
(Formula (9.3) is derived in [11].) In these terms, (yPS;¡kSt;¡kCo) 2 YPS if and only
if Z T
0
yPS (t) dt = 0; ·kSt (yPS) · kSt and ·kCo (yPS) · kCo:(9.5)
Unlike the thermal capacity and fuel requirements in (9.2), and unlike ·kCo (y), the
storage capacity requirement ·kSt (y) is not a symmetric function of y. But the storage
technology does meet the quasi-symmetry condition. We verify this by formalising
the following heuristic, in which Ã is the price of stock: take an electricity price p
which jumps at some t, i.e., p (t¡) < p (t+). Can the supply (from storage plant)
drop? If it does, i.e., y (t¡) > y (t+), then obviously y (t¡) > ¡kCo and y (t+) < kCo,
so p (t¡) ¸ Ã (t¡) and p (t+) · Ã (t+). Hence 0 < p (t+)¡p (t¡) · Ã (t+)¡Ã (t¡),
so the reservoir must be full at t, and it cannot be being discharged just before t or
charged just after t; i.e., y (t¡) · 0 · y (t+). This contradicts the drop in y. But the
argument is incomplete because p and y may fail to have the one-sided limits. The
need to make it rigorous is what has led us to the concept of quasi-symmetry.
Lemma 9.1. For every kPS = (kSt; kCo) 2 R2+, the set of feasible ‡ows from storage,
YPS (¡kPS) ½ L1 [0; T ], is quasi-symmetric (with the usual topology on [0; T ]).
Proof. Given a p 2 L1 [0; T ] and any tz 2 [0; T ] n domess p, take a storage policy y
that maximises the operating pro…t hp; ¢i on YPS (¡kPS). If kSt = 0 or kCo = 0, then
y = 0 and there is nothing to prove (since (5.21) holds by Remark 5.15). So assume
that kSt > 0 and kCo > 0. The stock trajectory associated with y is
s (t) = ¡
Z t
0
y (¿) d¿ + max
t2[0;T ]
Z t
0
y (¿ ) d¿(9.6)
(since the second summand is the initial stock required for s (t) never to fall below
0). The sets of those times when the reservoir is empty or full or neither are
E := ft 2 [0; T ] : s (t) = 0g(9.7)
F := ft 2 [0; T ] : s (t) = kStg :(9.8)
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As we show in [11] and [16], there exists a function Ã—which is the marginal value of
stock as a function of time (and depends of course on p and k)—with the following
properties:
1. Ã is of bounded variation on the interval (0; T ), with Ã (0) := Ã (0+) and
Ã (T ) := Ã (T¡) by convention.
2. Ã rises only on F and falls only on E. In formal terms, the sets F and E support,
respectively, the nonnegative and nonpositive parts of the signed Borel measure
de…ned by
dÃ [t0; t00] := Ã (t00+)¡ Ã (t0¡)(9.9)
for t0 · t00, with Ã (0¡) = Ã (T+) set equal to any number between Ã (0+) and
Ã (T¡).41 In symbols, supp (dÃ)+ µ F and supp (dÃ)¡ µ E.
3. The optimum output is of the “bang-bang” type on the set ft : p (t) 6= Ã (t)g;
i.e., for a.e. t 2 [0; T ]
y (t) =
(
kCo if p (t) > Ã (t)
¡kCo if p (t) < Ã (t)
:(9.10)
For simplicity choose variants of p and y which satisfy (9.10) for every t. There
are two cases, which require di¤erent arguments: “from prices to quantities” if Ã is
continuous, and “from quantities to prices” if Ã is discontinuous.42
Case 1: If Ã is continuous at tz, take any ® > 0 that is less than p (tz) ¡ p (tz) if
p (tz) and p (tz) are …nite. Fix any positive number ¯ · ® and an I 2 N (tz) such
that jÃ (t)¡ Ã (tz)j < ¯=2 for every t 2 I. By Remark 5.15, for every N 2 N (tz)
there exist sets A0 ½ N \ I and A00 ½ N \ I, both of positive measure, with
®+ p (t0) · p (t00)
for every t0 2 A0 and t00 2 A00. Suppose that y (t0) > y (t00) for some t0 2 A0 and t00 2 A00;
then of course y (t0) > ¡kCo and y (t00) < kCo, so p (t0) ¸ Ã (t0) and p (t00) · Ã (t00).
Hence the contradiction
® · p (t00)¡ p (t0) · Ã (t00)¡ Ã (t0) < ¯ · ®;
which shows that actually y (t0) · y (t00) for every t0 2 A0 and t00 2 A00. (This case
includes the cases of tz = 0 and tz = T , since at the endpoints Ã is de…ned by
continuity, which means one-sided continuity.)
Case 2: If Ã is discontinuous, at a tz 2 (0; T ), then Ã (tz¡) 6= Ã (tz+), so tz 2 E[F .
Consider, e.g., the case of Ã (tz¡) < Ã (tz+), in which tz 2 F . Take any positive
® < Ã (tz+)¡ Ã (tz¡)
41So dÃ has zero total mass, and dÃ f0g and dÃ fTg do not have opposite signs (which is conve-
nient when 0 and T are viewed as one point of a circle).
42Case 2 does not arise if p is continuous [11], but here the continuity of p must not be assumed
(since it is, of course, to be proved by using the present lemma).
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and any positive ² · Ã (tz+) ¡ Ã (tz¡) ¡ ®; and …x an I 2 N (tz) such that
jÃ (t)¡ Ã (tz¡)j · ²=2 for every t 2 I \ (0; tz) and jÃ (t)¡ Ã (tz+)j · ²=2 for ev-
ery t 2 I \ (tz; T ). Being full at tz, the reservoir cannot be being discharged just
before tz or charged just after tz. In formal terms, for every N 2 N (tz) it cannot be
that y > 0 a.e. on N \ I \ (0; tz); i.e., y · 0 on some nonnull set A0 µ N \ I \ (0; tz).
A fortiori p · Ã on A0. Similarly, on some nonnull set A00 µ N \ I \ (tz; T ) one has
y ¸ 0 and, hence, p ¸ Ã on A00. So, for every t0 2 A0 µ N and t00 2 A00 µ N ,
p (t0) · Ã (t0) · Ã (tz¡) + ²
2
and p (t00) ¸ Ã (t00) ¸ Ã (tz+)¡ ²
2
and therefore
p (t00)¡ p (t0) ¸ Ã (tz+)¡ Ã (tz¡)¡ ² ¸ ®:
This completes the proof, since
y (t00) ¸ 0 ¸ y (t0)
by the very choice of A0 and A00. (The case of Ã (tz¡) > Ã (tz+), in which tz 2 E, is
handled in a similar way.)
Comment: For Case 2 the Proof of Lemma 9.1 shows also that, for tz 2 F ,
Ã (tz¡) ¸ ess lim inf
¿%tz
p (¿) ¸ ess lim inf
¿!tz
p (¿ ) = p (tz)
Ã (tz+) · ess lim sup
¿&tz
p (¿) · ess lim sup
¿!tz
p (¿) = p (tz)
and so
0 · Ã (tz+)¡ Ã (tz¡) · p (tz)¡ p (tz) :
When the last inequality is strict, the choice of ® for Case 2 can be improved: as in
Case 1, any
® < p (tz)¡ p (tz)
will do. For ® > Ã (tz+) ¡ Ã (tz¡) this is shown as in Case 1: take any positive
¯ · ® ¡ (Ã (tz+)¡ Ã (tz¡)), and …x an I 2 N (tz) such that Ã (t) > Ã (tz¡) ¡ ¯=2
and Ã (t) < Ã (tz+)+¯=2 for every t 2 I. Again by Remark 5.15, for every N 2 N (tz)
there exist nonnull sets A0 ½ N \ I and A00 ½ N \ I with
®+ p (t0) · p (t00)
for every t0 2 A0 and t00 2 A00. Suppose contrarily that y (t0) > y (t00) for some t0 2 A0
and t00 2 A00; then y (t0) > ¡kCo and y (t00) < kCo, so p (t0) ¸ Ã (t0) and p (t00) · Ã (t00).
Hence the contradiction
® · p (t00)¡ p (t0) · Ã (t00)¡ Ã (t0) < Ã (tz+)¡ Ã (tz¡) + ¯ · ®
which shows, for every t0 2 A0 and t00 2 A00, that actually y (t0) · y (t00).
The Mackey continuity assumptions on the users’ utility and production functions,
Uh and F , mean that electricity consumption is interruptible (i.e., a brief interruption
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causes only a small loss of utility or output). As we show in [12], this guarantees that
the equilibrium TOU price is a density, i.e., a time-dependent rate in $/kWh. Sub-
symmetry conditions on Uh and F guarantee that the price density is continuous.
Theorem 9.2. The electricity pricing model has a long-run competitive equilibrium.
Furthermore:
1. If an equilibrium tari¤ p? 2 L1¤+ [0; T ] supports (together with some price %? 2
R+ for the other produced good) an equilibrium allocation with a nonzero elec-
tricity output y?Th + y
?
PS (from thermal generation and pumped storage), then
p? 2 L1+ [0; T ].
2. If additionally the set
©
x 2 L1+ : Uh (x; '?h;m?h) ¸ Uh (x?h; '?h;m?h)
ª
is strongly
sub-symmetric at x?h (for each household h), then p
? has a continuous variant,
viz., ess p? 2 C [0; T ].
Proof. By [1, Theorem 1] there is an equilibrium price system with p? 2 L1¤+ . And
actually p? 2 L1, as we show in [12]. This proves Part 1.
For Part 2, we verify the assumptions of Theorem 7.2. Since each of the Yµ’s
has symmetric sections, so does their sum YTh (Lemma 5.20). Since YPS has quasi-
symmetric sections (Lemma 9.1), and YIU has sub-symmetric sections (by assump-
tion), the total production set has quasi-symmetric sections (Lemma 5.21). For house-
holds, strong sub-symmetry at x?h is assumed. And x
En
h = 0 2 C+ [0; T ] trivially.
The conditions on Uh and F are met by additively separable utility and production
functions with a continuous marginal utility or productivity (Sections 5, 6 and 8).
This case uses Proposition 8.4, and hence it requires the following result.
Lemma 9.3. For each kPS = (kSt; kCo) 2 R2+, the set YPS (¡kPS) is pseudo-symmetric.
Proof. The function Ã on [0; T ], introduced in the Proof of Lemma 9.1, is bounded
(since it is of bounded variation). By (9.10), if p (t) > Sup (Ã) then y (t) = kCo ¸
EssSup (y). So (5.25) holds even with ± = 0 (and with p = Sup (Ã)).
Corollary 9.4. Assume that:
1. As in Section 8, each household’s utility Uh has the (concave) integral form (8.2),
with the instantaneous utility from electricity, uh (¢; ¢; ';m), satisfying (8.11),
(8.12) and (8.13) for any (';m) 2 R2+ (in place of m 2 RG+).
2. The industrial user’s production function, F , has the integral form (5.17).
Then any equilibrium tari¤ has a continuous variant, viz., ess p? 2 C++ [0; T ].
For each h, if uh is strictly concave (in its second variable, x), then the equilibrium
consumption of electricity has a continuous variant, essx?h 2 C++ [0; T ].
Proof. To show that p? is continuous, we verify the assumptions of Corollary 8.7. As
in the Proof of Theorem 9.2, the set YTh has symmetric sections and YPS has quasi-
symmetric sections. Additionally YIU has sub-symmetric sections (Example 5.13), so
the total production set has quasi-symmetric sections (by Parts 1 and 2 of Lemma 5.21).
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Also, both YPS and YIU have pseudo-symmetric sections (Lemma 9.3 and Exam-
ple 5.19); so the total production set has pseudo-symmetric sections (by Part 3 of
Lemma 5.21). Finally, xEnh = 0 for each h by assumption (so y
?
Th + y
?
PS ¡ z?, the
electricity output net of industrial consumption, is positive by Remark 8.3).
By assumption uh is increasing (in x), so p? À 0 by (8.4). Also, with uh strictly
concave (in x), x?h is continuous by Corollary 8.8. AndMin (x
?
h) > 0 by Corollary 8.5.
10. Conclusions
Equilibrium pricing of a continuous-time ‡ow such as electricity is likely to re-
quire a continuously varying price, to eliminate the demand jumps caused by sudden
switches between di¤erent price rates. Price continuity is also important for other
reasons, for example in rental valuation of storage plants. With cross-price indepen-
dent demand and supply curves, an equilibrium price varies continuously if the curves
do. A more general result is based on ideas from the Hardy-Littlewood-Pólya theory
of rearrangements. In particular, cost symmetry implies “similar arrangement” of
price and output trajectories. The assumption can be weakened for use with “non-
symmetric” technologies (such as energy storage), and it can also be adapted for use
with preferences. This gives what we believe to be the …rst applicable price continuity
result for competitive equilibrium in Lebesgue commodity and price spaces L½ (T ),
i.e., the spaces of bounded or integrable functions on a (topological) measure space
of commodity characteristics.
Appendix A. Lower and upper essential values
Assume that T is a (Hausdor¤) topological space, and that ¾ is a measure on a
sigma-algebra, A, of subsets of T that contains the Borel sigma-algebra. Recall that
L0 (T; ¾) is the vector space of all (¾-equivalence classes of) measurable R-valued
functions on T .
De…nition A.1. For every p 2 L0 (T ), the lower essential value of p at t is
ess p (t) := sup
N2N (t)
ess inf
N
p(A.1)
i.e., it is the supremum, on the neighbourhood system N (t), of the essential in…mum
of p in any neighbourhood, N , of t. The upper essential value of p at t is
ess p (t) := inf
N2N (t)
ess sup
N
p:(A.2)
The notations are abbreviated to p and p. Where p (t) and p (t) are equal and …nite,
their common value is the essential value of p at t, denoted by ess p (t). Its domain is
domess p =
©
t 2 T : ¡1 < p (t) = p (t) < +1ª :
Comments:
1. The essential values are literally functions (rather than equivalence classes).
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2. For p 2 L1, equivalent de…nitions of p, p and ess p are given in, e.g., [29, II.9:
pp. 89–90].
3. ess infT p · p (t) and p (t) · ess supT p, with equalities at some t 2 T . So unless
p 2 L1, both p and p are extended real-valued functions, from T into R[f§1g.
But ess p is …nite (on domess p).
4. The lower and upper essential limits of p at t are usually de…ned by means of
pierced neighbourhoods, i.e.,
ess lim inf
¿!t
p (¿) := sup
N2N (t)
ess inf
Nnftg
p
ess lim sup
¿!t
p (¿) := inf
N2N (t)
ess sup
Nnftg
p:
The limits are identical to the values (A.1)–(A.2) if ¾ ftg = 0. This is the case
in [5, IV.36–IV.37]—where ¾ = meas, and T is an interval of R. The one-sided,
left or right, essential limits are then de…ned as well.
5. If ¾ ftg > 0 (i.e., t is an atom for ¾) then
ess p (t) = min
n
p (t) ; ess lim inf
¿!t
p (¿ )
o
ess p (t) = max
½
p (t) ; ess lim sup
¿!t
p (¿ )
¾
:
6. The essential limit is the limit for the essential topology [5, p. 105].
The following account of the key results on essential values combines those of [5,
IV.37] and [29, II.9: pp. 90, 91, 94].
Lemma A.2. For every p 2 L0 (T; ¾):
1. The lower value p is lower semicontinuous, and the upper value p is upper semi-
continuous (each as a function from T into R[f§1g).
2. If the topology of T has a countable base of open sets, then p · p · p almost
everywhere on T (w.r.t. ¾).
3. If every nonempty open subset of T is ¾-nonnull,43 then p · p everywhere on T .
Proof. For Part 1, …x any t 2 T and any number p > p (t). By the de…nition (A.2)
of p, there exists an N 2 N (t) with ess supN p < p. For every ¿ 2 N , also by
(A.2), p (¿ ) · ess supN p < p. This shows that p is upper semicontinuous. The lower
semicontinuity of p is proved in the same way.
For Part 2, partition T into T 0 = ft : p (t) = +1g and T 00 = ft : ¡1 · p (t) < +1g.
On T 0 obviously p = +1 ¸ p.
43If a set N 6= ; is open but ¾-null then p = ¡1 < +1 = p on N . When T has a countable open
base, this case can be excluded by removing the largest open set of measure zero, i.e., the union of
all open sets of measure zero.
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Next, take any sequence of functions fn & p on T 00 as n% +1, e.g.,
fn (t) =
(
p (t) + 1
n
if p (t) > ¡1
¡n if p (t) = ¡1
and de…ne
Gn := ft 2 T 00 : p (t) ¸ fn (t)g :
Fix n. For every t 2 T 00 there exists an N 2 N (t) with ¾ (Gn \N) = 0 (because
nonexistence of such an N would mean that p (t) ¸ fn (t) > p (t)). Since such an
N can be chosen from the countable open base, there is a countable open cover
fNk : k = 1; 2; : : : g of T 00 such that ¾ (Gn \Nk) = 0 for each k. Hence ¾ (Gn) = 0 for
every n, and it follows that
¾ ft 2 T 00 : p (t) > p (t)g = ¾
Ã
+1[
n=1
Gn
!
= 0:
So p · p a.e. on T ; and p ¸ p by a similar argument.
For Part 3, since every N 2 N (t) is ¾-nonnull one has ess infN p · ess supN p; and
so
ess inf
N
p · p · p · ess sup
N
p
by the de…nitions (A.1)–A.2).
So when the essential value of p exists everywhere on T , it is “automatically”
continuous, and it is a variant of p.
Corollary A.3. Assume that T has a countable base of open sets which are ¾-
nonnull. If domess p = T , then ess p 2 C (T ) and ess p = p almost everywhere
on T (w.r.t. ¾).
Appendix B. Uniform continuity and inverse continuity
For a jointly continuous map M on a product of two topological spaces, the impli-
cations of compactness of one or both spaces are spelt out (for use in the Proofs of
Examples 5.12, 5.13 and 6.2).
Lemma B.1. Assume that T is a (Hausdor¤) topological space, K is a metrisable
compact with a metric dK, and dR is a metric on a set R. Then any continuous map
M : T£K ! R is (jointly) continuous uniformly in the second variable; i.e., for every
t 2 T and every number ² > 0 there exist a neighbourhood H of t and a number ± > 0
such that for every t0 and t00 in H and for every x0 and x00 in K with dK (x0; x00) < ±
one has dR (M (t0; x0) ;M (t00; x00)) < ².
Comments:
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1. If T is, like K, a compact metric space, then so is T £K; in which case every
continuous map M is uniformly continuous on T £K (i.e., for every ² > 0 there
exists a ± > 0 such that, for every t0 and t00 in T and for every x0 and x00 in K,
if dT (t0; t00) < ± and dK (x0; x00) < ± then dR (M (t0; x0) ;M (t00; x00)) < ²). This—
joint continuity that is uniform in both variables—is obviously stronger than the
property established in Lemma B.1.
2. Partial continuity ofM in t that holds uniformly in x is deduced from Lemma B.1
by setting x0 = x00. This weaker conclusion is stated in, e.g., [19, Lemma IX.3.1].
Proof of Lemma B.1. Suppose contrarily that, for some t 2 T and ² > 0, there exist
nets (t0n) and (t
00
n) that converge to t, and (x
0
n) and (x
00
n) with dK (x
0
n; x
00
n)! 0, such that
dR (M (t
0
n; x
0
n) ;M (t
00
n; x
00
n)) ¸ ² for every n 2 N(B.1)
(where N is the directed set on which the nets are de…ned). Since K is compact, one
can assume (by passing to subnets) that (x0n) and (x
00
n) converge, to the same limit
x 2 K. Then both M (t0n; x0n) and M (t00n; x00n) converge to M (t; x); and this contradicts
(B.1).
Corollary B.2. If a continuous function M : T £ [x; x]! R is nonincreasing in the
second variable (which ranges over a bounded closed interval of R), then for every
t 2 T and ² > 0 there exist a neighbourhood H of t and a ± > 0 such that for every t0
and t00 inH and for every x0 and x00 in [x; x], if x0 < x00+± then ²+M (t0; x0) > M (t00; x00).
Proof. By Lemma B.1 (applied to K = [x; x] and R = R, both with the usual metric
d (a; b) = ja¡ bj), there exist a neighbourhood H of t and a ± > 0 such that ² +
M (t0; x0) > M (t00; x00) if t0, t00 2 H and x00 · x0 < x00 + ±. In particular, this applies to
x0 = x00; and for the complementary case of x0 · x00 it follows that
²+M (t0; x0) > M (t00; x0) ¸M (t00; x00)
by the monotonicity of M (t00; ¢).
When the inverse of M (t; ¢) exists for each t, it is jointly continuous if the domain
of M is compact.
Lemma B.3. Assume that both T and K are compact spaces, and M : T £K ! R
is a (jointly) continuous map into another (Hausdor¤) topological space. If for each
t 2 T the map Mt =M (t; ¢) is invertible, then so is the map
T £K 3 (t; x) 7! (t;M (t; x)) 2 T £R:(B.2)
The inverse is de…ned, on the compact range of (B.2), by
(t; r) 7! ¡t;M¡1t (r)¢ 2 T £K(B.3)
and it is also continuous. Hence the map (t; r) 7!M¡1t (r) is continuous.
Proof. WithMt invertible, the inverse of (B.2) obviously exists and is given by (B.2).
Its continuity, and the compactness of its domain, are special cases of the result stated
in, e.g., [27, 5.9.1].
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